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FOREWORD
Respondents to public opinion polls have long
ranked the Army among Mexico’s most respected institutions, along with the Roman Catholic Church and
universities. There has not been a president with a
military background since 1946, no retired or active
duty officers hold a governorship, and—above all—
the armed forces obey civilian leaders. Unlike many
Latin American nations, Mexico has not suffered a
coup d’état for nearly 100 years.
In the absence of honest, professional civilian lawenforcement agencies, President Felipe Calderón assigned the military the lead role in his nation’s version of the “War on Drugs” that he launched in 2006.
While the armed forces have spearheaded the capture
and/or death of several dozen cartel capos, the conflict has taken its toll on the organizations in terms of
deaths, corruption, desertions, and charges by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) of hundreds of
human rights violations. The nation’s Supreme Court
has taken the first step in requiring that officers and
enlistees accused of crimes against civilians stand trial
in civil courts rather than hermetic military tribunals.
As if combating vicious narco-syndicates were not
a sufficiently formidable challenge, the government
has assigned such additional roles to the Army and
Navy as overseeing customs agents, serving as state
and municipal security chiefs, taking charge of prisons, protecting airports, safeguarding migrants, functioning as firefighters, preventing drug trafficking
around schools, establishing recreational programs
for children, and standing guard 24-hours a day over
boxes of ballots cast in recent elections. Meanwhile,
because of their discipline, training, and skill with fire-
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arms, security firms are snapping up men and women
who have retired from active duty.
The sharp expansion of the armed forces’ duties
has sparked the accusation that Mexico is being “militarized.” Contributing to this assertion is the Defense
Ministry’s robust, expensive public relations campaign both to offset criticism of civilians killed in what
the Pentagon would label “collateral damage” and to
increase contacts between average citizens and military personnel, who often constituted a separate caste.
This campaign is evident in recruiting videos, advertisements in Twitter, and the portrayal of combat
successes on YouTube.
Creativity infuses the outreach programs, which
are aimed at average people and often take place in
connection with parades and other ceremonial extravaganzas. Obliging pilots encourage adults and children to hop into the seat of a recently-landed helicopter; other wide-eyed youngsters grasp the controls of
anti-aircraft weapons; admiring onlookers are invited
to shake hands and have photos taken with nationally
prominent military athletes; in Veracruz and other
ports, residents are given tours of ships, landing craft,
and submarines.
The Army has gone out of its way to tout opportunities for women, who traditionally filled posts as
nurses, secretaries, translators, doctors, and dentists.
Now the Defense Ministry has opened all of its instructional institutions, including the Heroic War College (Mexico’s version of West Point), to females.
Dr. George W. Grayson examines the ever wider
involvement of the armed forces in Mexican life in
addressing the question: “Is Mexican society being
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‘militarized’?” If the answer is “yes,” what will be
the probable impact on relations between the United
States and its southern neighbor?
			

			
			
			

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Poet and essayist Javier Sicilia, whose son was
captured, tortured, and murdered by thugs in 2011,
wrote an open letter “To Mexico’s Politicians and
Criminals” in which he accused politicians of complicity in the criminal activities. “We cannot cry out,” he
said, “because this government is the same as members of organized crime and can think only in terms
of violence and the wish to militarize the country. . . .”
The problem lies in Mexico’s seldom if ever having
had an effective, uncorrupted, and professional police
force whose members knew their communities, could
referee barroom fights and other minor disputes, and
could gain the confidence of the citizenry to assist
in fighting crime. In the 19th century, dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911) relied on the brutal “Rurales”
to repress opponents. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated the political system
from 1929 to 2000, created some 3,000 municipal, state,
and federal law-enforcement agencies, according to
analyst Benjamin Reames. However, venality, extortion, poor training, incompetence, and low pay characterized most of the 350,000 elements in these units.
PRI officials often deployed these policemen to spy
on opponents, settle scores with foes, and operate as
bagmen for payoffs from narco-traffickers and other
denizens of the underworld.
As a result, Presidents Vicente Fox (2000-06) and
Felipe Calderón (2006-12) relied heavily on the men
and women in uniform to combat the cartels that import, store, process, sell at home, and export drugs.
Although involved in drug eradication for 4 decades,
soldiers are trained to pursue, capture, and kill—with
little experience in urban settings. The violence asso-
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ciated with these activities had taken more than 47,000
lives by the time Enrique Peña Nieto was inaugurated
on December 1, 2012.
This monograph explores whether Mexico’s protracted drug war has “militarized” the country. In
the United States, when politicians cannot resolve a
thorny issue such as teenage pregnancies, drug abuse,
obesity, poor nutrition, environmental awareness,
latch-key youngsters, etc., they often assign responsibility to the public schools. Such is the case of Mexican leaders with respect to criminality. In many cases,
they have either expanded existing functions carried
out by the Ministry of National Defense (SEDENA)
and the Navy Ministry (SEMAR) or thrust new tasks
upon them.
Law-enforcement is a case in point. For years, retired officers have served as state and municipal public security officials or police chiefs—typically with
the approval of the National Defense Secretary. The
number of such appointments has mushroomed in recent years. The number of military men performing
these roles in states and major cities has shot up from
six in February 2009 to approximately 50 in mid-2012.
Meanwhile, local officials who have purged contaminated police departments recruit military retirees
to fill their places. After ousting half of the city’s 400
policemen in Santa Catarina, a city in metropolitan
Monterrey, the mayor made clear his determination
to hire “elements with a military profile” to undertake patrol and surveillance duties. In essence, politicians have more confidence in men and women who
have learned discipline, order, and team work in the
armed forces.
Formerly, there were limited contacts between civilians and the military except at the highest levels of
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government and on ceremonial occasions. The fight
against drug-inspired criminality has changed this
situation. Now in Tijuana and Ensenada, Baja California, the Army and Navy regularly hold sessions with
representatives of the state government and the tourism sector. In other areas, so-called “purple groups”
have sprung to life to enable political and civic activists to meet regularly members of the Army, Navy,
and Federal Police.
Private security firms that have mushroomed in
number are increasingly reaching out to the military.
In recruiting body guards, skilled drivers, technical
experts, and consultants, private security firms often
seek former military personnel not only because of
their training and discipline, but also because they
have the legal right to carry firearms.
The Army and Navy have ever more interaction with civilian functionaries who are vulnerable
to being suborned. Recent presidents have sought
to mitigate the corruption that flourishes within the
Mexico’s Customs Administration—a Herculean challenge in view of princely payoffs. Enter the armed
forces. In mid-August 2009, they took over functions
of the Fiscal Police in 49 land ports along the northern border. For its part, the Navy began overseeing
customs operations in seaports. Two years earlier,
the Army assumed the inspection of passengers at the
airport in Mexicali, capital of Baja California, because
Federal Policemen were suspected of facilitating cocaine shipments by the notorious Sinaloa Cartel to the
United States.
Military men have also been drawn into guarding
and, in some cases, operating prisons. In mid-August
2009, General Felipe de Jesús Espitia, commander of
the Fifth Military Zone, announced that troops would
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replace civilian administrators and guards at the penitentiary in Aquiles Serdán. Officers also serve as directors of the penal facilities in the three largest cities
in Quintana Roo even as they control access to three
large Monterrey penal facilities.
Abuses arising from the pursuit of drug lords may
alter a tradition that dates to the Middle Ages; namely,
trying Army and Navy personnel accused of crimes
in military courts or fueros. Early in Calderón’s term
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) inveighed
against the trampling of human rights, homing in on
the 200,000-member Army. Mexico’s zealous National
Human Rights Commission claimed to have received
5,055 complaints, many against the military, while
asserting that 5,300 people had disappeared amid assaults on crime families.
The drum beat of international outrage finally
grabbed the attention of Mexico’s brass, which created
the position of General Director for Human Rights in
its command structure in what one observer labeled
“a milestone that passed relatively unnoticed by most
media and analysts.” In response to freedom-of-information petitions, SEDENA has begun to shed light on
judicial actions. In February 2012, it reported that 344
members of the Army were behind bars, while others
were either standing trial or under arrest. In August
2012, newspapers carried front-page stories of the
incarceration of five generals in the Almoloya highsecurity prison in Mexico State. In mid-2012, Mexico’s
Supreme Court, or SCJN, was considering what cases,
if any, involving members of the armed forces would
be heard in civil tribunals.
In light of charges of wrongdoing by their members, SEDENA and the SEMAR have moved into
the public relations arena. To herald both positive
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achievements and attract more volunteers, the Army
began running advertisements on television, Twitter,
and YouTube, along with brief recruiting videos before
the beginning of motion pictures. Outlays for this advertising soared to 46 million pesos (approximately
$3.5 million) in 2011.
An additional effort to close the chasm between
the armed services and the population found Army
and Navy personnel mixed with the crowds following
the September 16 Independence Day marches. “Look,
Papa!” shouted a 9-year-old boy, who sat proudly in
an armored vehicle with both hands grasping the controls of an anti-aircraft weapon.
SEDENA has also attempted to broaden its appeal
to the citizenry and overcome its machista image by
opening to females all of its 17 specialized schools,
including those for combat instruction, basic and advanced military police training, preparation of sergeants, and the formation of officers for the Heroic
War College. Greater chances for women spring from
social and international pressure, the presence of more
skilled women prepared to enter the armed forces,
and the need to recruit more elements in an institution plagued by desertions. One leftist deputy even
looked to the not-too-distant future when a woman
could become secretary of defense—a will-o’-the-wisp
for decades to come.
In a further endeavor to strengthen the esprit de
corps and discourage desertions, SEDENA has raised
salaries, initiated 21-gun salutes at burials, made certain that military bands were on hand to honor the
fallen, provided a memorial flag to the wife, authorized a life pension for widows, and furnished broader insurance coverage. Furthermore, it has erected
a monument to soldiers who died while serving
their country.
xiii

The mayhem afflicting parts of the nation and the
death of some 30 mayors has required more military
participating in guaranteeing the security of elections.
Leonardo Valdés Zurita, president of the Federal
Electoral Institute that organizes elections, formally
invited the Army to help safeguard the mid-2012 balloting. So narrow was Calderón’s 2006 victory that
the soldiers still guard the ballots cast in that bitter
showdown.
Although completely loyal to civilian leaders, key
officers have spoken out on political matters—a sign
of their greater participation in national life. General Sergio Aponte Polito, a regional commander in
northwest Mexico, publically excoriated the ubiquitous involvement of elected and appointed officials
in drug trafficking in the Tijuana area. He claimed
that the police were cooperating with migrant smugglers, bank robbers, and drug lords. “What he’s doing is completely unprecedented,” stated Roderic Ai
Camp, an expert on the Mexican military at Claremont
McKenna College. Aponte Polito’s persistent criticism upset the National Action Party administration
in Baja California and led to his being transferred to
Mexico City.
At the same time, General Galván and his subordinates make no secret of their desire to amend the Code
of Military Justice to unambiguously justify the military’s profound involvement in the drug war. Generals and admirals want protection against NGOs who
have accused senior officers of war crimes before the
International Court of Justice and other tribunals. If
convicted, these officers would be unlikely to prosper
and would prove an embarrassment to services proud
of their reputations.
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The drug war and new tasks have expanded the
Army’s budget, size, and stock of equipment. Regrettably, contact with the underworld has corrupted
numerous enlistees and officers and questions have
arisen over the acquisition of armaments. Such sensitive questions aside, Washington can assist Mexico’s
crusade against crime syndicates at the margins—
with intelligence, training, equipment, and monetary
oversight. Mutual security concerns will lead to more
and closer contacts between the U.S. military and security agencies and their Mexican counterparts even
as SEDENA and SEMAR reach out to Canada, Colombia, and other countries for training, specialized arms,
intelligence, and instruction in cyber security.
The U.S. Northern Command can also be helpful
by furnishing language training, information, radars,
night goggles, and other used surveillance equipment
to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol and other organizations such as the Texas Department of Public Security. The accelerated flow of drugs and drug-merchants across the 2,000-mile binational frontier and
the southward cascade of weapon have multiplied the
tasks of both agencies.
Ultimately, the key players have to be our neighbor’s political, economic, and social establishment.
As things stand now, many of the privileged outside
the country’s North live cocooned from much of the
bloodshed, thanks to sophisticated security systems,
trained drivers, skilled bodyguards, the resources to
educate their youngsters abroad, and the wherewithal
to move their families to Texas and other border states.
The Mexican nomenklatura must comprehend that
even if a miracle took place and narco-activities disappeared overnight, their nation would still be home
to a deadly nether world whose ruthless inhabitants
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are adept at murder, torture, kidnapping, extortion,
money laundering, loan-sharking, prostitution, human smuggling, and a score of other crimes. Above
all, U.S. civilian and military decisionmakers must
avoid hubris and recognize the severe limitation on
ameliorating, much less solving, formidable problems
in other countries unless local leaders challenge the
miscreants in their midst.
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THE IMPACT OF
PRESIDENT FELIPE CALDERÓN’S WAR
ON DRUGS ON THE ARMED FORCES:
THE PROSPECTS FOR MEXICO’S
“MILITARIZATION”
AND BILATERAL RELATIONS
MEXICO’S MILITARIZATION?
Introduction.
President Felipe Calderón’s Mexican version
of the “war on drugs” has unleashed criticism that
he is “militarizing” the nation by deploying tens of
thousands of troops against Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs).
Anthropologist Abel Barrera
Hernández, director of the Human Rights Center of
Tlachinollan, has excoriated the “violence expressed
in militarization and the seizure of land and natural
resources” in impoverished, indigenous areas. Poet
and essayist Javier Sicilia, whose son was captured,
tortured, and murdered by thugs, has accused politicians of complicity in the criminal activities. “We cannot cry out,” he said, “because this government is the
same as members of organized crime and can think
only in terms of violence and the wish to militarize the
country. . . .” Along the same lines, students in Cuernavaca formed the National Coordinating System
against Militarization and sponsored a forum titled
“Young People and the National Emergency.”1
Alexandro Poiré Romero, former technical secretary of the National Security Council and later Interior
Secretary (Gobernación), denied any trend toward
militarization. He insisted that most of their operations do not involve fighting criminal bands. Additionally, Poiré stated that:
1

Neither the Army nor the Navy . . . is supplanting police
agencies. At present the elements deployed, together
with the Federal Police, are temporarily . . . assisting civilian authorities, not acting alone, he affirmed. The use
of the Armed forces to combat organized crime will be
less necessary when local police forces improve their
professionalization and [achieve] certification.2

Improving the quality of local police is a slow process at best, a chimera at worst. Much of the political
elite, often for self-serving reasons, fiercely oppose a
national police force similar to those in Chile, France,
and Spain, and young people recoil from a career in
law enforcement. The lion’s share of governors and
mayors remain adamantly against melding their own
forces into a national structure. Members of the Army
brass have quietly registered misgivings, fearing that
(1) attempts to establish a first-rate national police
force would reduce the armed forces budget, (2) military police would have to train the recruits, and (3) at
the end of the process, corruption would remain ubiquitous and virulent.
The problem lies in Mexico’s seldom, if ever, having had an effective, uncorrupted, and professional
police force whose members knew their communities,
could referee barroom fights and other minor disputes,
and could gain the confidence of the citizenry.3 As a
result, Presidents Vicente Fox (2000-06) and Calderón
(2006-12) have relied heavily on the men and women
in uniform to combat the cartels that import, store,
process, sell at home, and export drugs. Although
involved in drug eradication for 4 decades, soldiers
are trained to pursue, capture, and kill—with little
experience in urban settings. The violence associated
with these activities, which took more than 47,000
lives during the 6 years of his administration, appears
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destined to rise even higher under Enrique Peña Nieto, who donned the presidential sash on December
1, 2012. This monograph (1) provides an overview of
the military’s participation in Mexico’s version of the
crusade against drugs, (2) focuses on the recruitment
of military men to serve in traditionally civilian law
enforcement posts, (3) indicates tasks that the armed
forces have assumed or expanded in recent years, and
(4) examines the longer term impact of the Army’s
ever-enlarging role in the country’s affairs as a result
of battling DTOs.
Overview of the Military’s Role in Drug War.
President Fox committed an average of 19,293
troops annually to battling drug trafficking. This figure soared 133 percent to 45,000 during the Calderón
sexenio. In 2009 alone, the Army assigned 48,750 men
to combating narcotics syndicates—with approximately one-quarter of these cadres involved in joint
operations with the Navy, the Federal Police, the U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Homeland Security Department, and other agencies.4 The
emphasis on the military produced mixed results.
The National Defense Ministry (SEDENA) announced
that, between December 1, 2006, and late December
2011, it had arrested 41,023 suspects, while killing
2,321 criminals.
In a separate report, SEDENA published an annual review of criminals whose lives it had taken: 2007
(22), 2008 (78), 2009 (211), 2010, (734), and through
December 20, 2011 (1,246).5 As part of the government’s “Kingpin Strategy,” the military apprehended
or killed several dozen important capos, whose names
appear in Figure 1. The Navy (SEMAR), which has
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substantially increased its participation in battling
narcos, came away with a collective red face in June
2012 when it touted the arrest of the son of the nation’s
most-wanted kingpin, Sinaloa Cartel head, Joaquín “El
Chapo” Guzmán Loera. It turned out to be a case of
mistaken identity, and they had taken a Felix Beltrán
León, 23, an automobile salesman, into custody.6 In
all fairness, the two men bore a striking resemblance,
and the Navy reported that Beltrán León had a large
cache of weapons and money in his possession. Evercynical critics of the drug war claimed that these items
were planted to justify the capture.
Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Heriberto Lazcano
Lazcan

Commander of Los Zetas.

Oct. 8; captured in
Coahuila (COAH).

Navy/Marines

Barajas, José
Ricardo

Los Zetas (allegedly
involved in the May 13,
2012, massacre of 49 to
60 innocents in Cadereyta,
Nuevo León [NL]).

July 31; Santa
Catarina, NL.

Army

July 26; captured
Huejotzingo,
Puebla
(PUE).

Navy

June 6; captured
PUE.

Navy

Leader
2012

Guizar Cárdenas,
Mauricio “El
Amarillo”

Villarreal Barragán,
Sergio Enrique “El
Grande”

Los Zetas; assumed
leadership in Tabasco
(TAB),
Veracruz VC), Chiapas
(CHIS),
Campeche (CAMP), and
Quintana Roo (QR) after the
arrest of “Lucky”
Lechuga in Dec. 2011.
Beltrán Leyva
Organization (BLO).

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed by the Army,
Navy, and Federal Police from 2007 to mid-2012.
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Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Elizondo Ramírez,
Daniel “El Loco”

Los Zetas (allegedly
involved in the May 13,
2012, massacre of 49 to 60
innocents in Cadereyta,
NL).

May 18; captured
Guadalupe, near
Monterrey, NL.

Army

Pérez Casanova,
Luis
Alberto “Casanova”

Alleged chief of a group of
bodyguards for Los Zetas
in central VC.

May 3; captured
Colonia Las
Ánimas de
Xalapa, VC.

Navy as part of the
coordinated
operation
called “Veracruz
Seguro”

Cázares Zambada,
Sergio and
Zambada
Apodaca, Omar
Israel

Sinaloa Cartel; nephews of
Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada
García, number two in the
Sinaloa Cartel, headed
by the notorious
Joaquín “El Chapo”
Guzmán Loera.

April 24; Tijuana,
Baja California
(BC).

Tijuana Municipal
Police and Army

Domínguez Vélez,
Romero “El
Chaparro”

Los Zetas Plaza chief in
Coatzacoalcos, Tamaulipas
(TAMPS).

April 25; captured
Coatzacoalcos,
VC.

Army

Leader
2012 (cont.)

Fragoso Martínez,
José
Carmen “El
Conchas”/
“El Comandante
Reyes”

Activist for Los Zetas
in a dozen VC
municipalities; arrested
with several comrades.

Medina Mejía,
Francisco “El
Quemado”

Zeta leader who masterminded the Aug. 25,
2011 fire-bombing of
Monterrey’s Casino
Royale.

April 18; captured
Minatitlán, VC,
along
with the mayor of
Chinameca and
four accomplices.
April 5: captured
on the
border of TAMPS
and NL.

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.

5

Army

Army

Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Serna Padilla, José
Guadalupe or
Hernández Muñiz, Oswaldo
“El Zopilote”

A leader of the New
Generation Jalisco
Cartel (CJNG).

March 18;
captured
Zapotiltic, Jalisco
(JAL),
along with Óscar
Pozos Jiménez.

Army

Valencia Salazar,
Eric
“El 85”

CJNG

Ramírez Cuenca,
Valentín
“El Comandante
Balón”

Los Zetas Plaza chief in
La Comarca Lagunera.

March 7: captured
Gómez Palacio,
Durango (DGO).

Army

Guerra Valdez,
Gerardo “El
Guerra”/
“Z-15”

Plaza chief in Nuevo
Laredo since Aug. 2,
2011 when he replaced
Jorge Luis de la Peña
Brizuela, aka “Pompín,”
who was killed.

March 1; killed
Nuevo Laredo,
TAMPS.

Army

Los Zetas ranking Zeta;
Formerly Plaza chief in San
Luis Potosí, which oversaw the killing of U.S.
Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Agent
Jaime Zapata.

Jan. 11; captured
on
border between
Coahuila (COAH)
and NL.

Army

Rodríguez Olivera,
Luis “El Güero”

Head of Los Güeros and
supposedly linked to the
Sinaloa Cartel.

Dec. 27; captured
Distrito Federal
(DF) Airport

Federal Police

Cabrera Sarabia,
Felipe “El Inge”

Sinaloa Cartel
“El Chapo” lieutenant.

Dec. 23; captured
Culiacán, Sinaloa
(SIN).

Army

Hernández
Lechuga,
Raúl “El
Lucky”/“Z-16”

Los Zetas; member of
original cadres; linked
to disappearance of 9
Navy personnel;
regional leader for
southeast part of the
country.

Dec. 12; captured
Córdoba, VC.

Navy

Leader
2012 (cont.)

Sarabia Ramón,
José
Luis “El Pepito”

March 9; captured
Zapopan, JAL.

Army

2011

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
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Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Cárdenas Rivera,
Ezequiel “El Junior”

Gulf Cartel; son of Leader
Antonio Ezequiel “Tony
Tormenta” Cárdenas
Guillén.

Nov. 29: captured
Matamoros,
TAMPS.

Ramírez Morales,
Santos “El Santo
Sapo”

Los Zetas Plaza chief in
Chiapas and Tabasco.

Nov. 24: capture
announced
Ocozocoautla,
CHIS.

Army

Vega Pacheco, José
Augusto “El Pino”

Los Zetas; recruited police
for Los Zetas in Hidalgo and
linked to 8 murders.

Nov. 21; captured
Pachuca, Hidalgo
(HGO).

Hidalgo Public
Security Police

Alemán Narváez,
Alfredo “El
Comandante
Alemán”

Los Zetas; active in San Luis
Potosí.

Nov. 15; captured
Fresnillo,
Zacatecas (ZAC)

Army

Orozco Favela, Juan
Gabriel “El Gasca”

Knights Templars
Plaza chief in Morelia.

Nov. 13; captured
Morelia,
Michoacán
(MICH).

Army

Limón Sánchez,
Ovidio

Sinaloa Cartel

Nov. 9; captured
Culiacán, SIN.

Army

Sillas Rocha, Juan
Francisco “El
Sillas”/
“El Rueda”

Tijuana Cartel
Arellano Félix
Organization (AFO);
key lieutenant to cartel
chief Fernando “El
Ingeniero” Sánchez
Arellano.

Nov. 5; captured
Tijuana, BC.

Army

Rodríguez Báez,
Héctor Russell “El
Toro”

La Familia

Nov. 5; captured
Chalco, Mexico
State
(EDOMEX).

Federal Police

Oliva Castillo,
Carlos
“La Rana”

Los Zetas

Oct. 12; captured
Saltillo, COAH.

Leader
2011 (cont.)

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
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Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Salgueiro, Noel
“El Flaco Salgueiro”

Founder of La Gente
Nueva (gang linked
to Sinaloa Cartel).

Capture
announced
Oct. 5; Culiacán,
SIN.

Army

Solis Solís, Saúl
“El Lince”

Knights Templars;
cousin of one of
organization’s top leaders,
Enrique
Plancarte Solís.

Sept. 19; captured
Mújica, Nueva
Italia,
MICH.

Army

Moreno Flores,
José
Carlos or Héctor
Adán Rubalcava
Rivera “La
Calentura”

Sinaloa Cartel chief
operator in Guerrero.

Sept. 18; captured
Tlalpan, DF.

Army

Flores Borrego,
Samuel “El Metro”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief in
Reynosa and ranking
member of syndicate.

Sept. 2; Army
announced
finding the body;
killed by Los
Zetas.

Los Zetas

BLO Lieutenant for
Guerrero’s “Costa
Grande.”

Aug. 13; captured
QR.

Army

De la Peña Brizuela,
Jorge Luis “El
Pompín”

Los Zetas

Aug. 2; killed
Nuevo
Laredo, TAMPS.

Army

Quintanilla Soriano
Valdemar “El Adal”

Los Zetas
financial operator

Aug. 2; captured
Saltillo, COAH.

Army

Beltrán Coronel,
Martín “El Águila”

Guadalajara Cartel and
allied with Sinaloa
Cartel.

Capture
announced
May 13; Zapopan,
JAL.

Army

Manuel de Jesús
Palma Morquecho
Manuel de Jesús
“Macario”

Cártel del Pacifico;
specialized in drug
shipments in Sonora.
Plaza boss for Nogales,
Agua Prieta, Naco,
and Cananea.

July 28; captured
Agua Prieta,
Sonora
(SON).

Army

Leader
2011 (cont.)

Benítez Servín,
Ricardo
“El Mudo”

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
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Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Los Zetas; believed to
have participated in the
Aug. 2010 assassination of
Santiago, NL, Mayior
Edemiro Cavazos Leal.

Capture
announced
July 10; Santiago,
NL.

Army

Mora Cortes, Sergio
Antonio “El Toto”

Los Zetas

Capture
announced
Feb. 28; Saltillo,
COAH.

Navy (Marines)

Zapata Espinoza,
Julián
“El Piolín” or
“Tweety Bird”

Los Zetas; involved in
attack on two agents of the
U.S. ICE.

Feb. 23; captured
San Luis Potosí,
SLP,

Navy (Marines)

Beltrán Leyva,
Arturo
“El Barbas”

BLO

Dec. 16; killed
Cuernavaca,
Morelos
(MOR).

Navy (Marines)

Cárdenas Guillén,
Ezequiel
“Tony Tormenta”

Gulf Cartel

Nov. 5; killed
Matamoros,
TAMPS.

Navy (Marines)

Poveda Ortega,
Harold
Mauricio
“El Cornejo”/“El
Flaco”

BLO;
link with Colombian
Norte de Valle cartel.

Nov. 5; captured
DF.

Federal Police

Valdez Villarreal,
Édgar “La Barbie”

Independent Cartel of
Acapulco (CIDA).

Aug.10; captured
near DF.

Federal Police

Coronel Villarreal,
Ignacio “Nacho”

Guadalajara Cartel and
allied with Sinaloa Cartel.

July 29; killed
Zapopan, JAL.

Army

Villarreal Barragán,
Sergio Enrique
“El Grande”

BLO

Sept. 12; captured
PUE.

Navy (Marines)

Martínez López,
Erick Alejandro
“El Motokles”

Los Zetas
QR.

March 27:
captured
DF.

Army

Leader
2011 (cont.)
Abarte Arreaga,
Javier
“La Jaiba”

2010

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
9

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

March 14:
captured
on highway
between
Chancalá, CHIS,
and
Emiliano Zapata,
TAB.

Army

Gulf Cartel; active in
Guanajuato; captured with
2 accomplices.

Feb. 3: captured
Cancún, QR.

Army

Formerly Tijuana/AFO.

Jan. 2; captured
La Paz,
Baja California Sur
(BCS).

Federal Police

Carlos Beltrán
Leyva

BLO

Dec. 30; captured
Culiacán, SIN.

Federal Police

Amdaya Espinoza,
Floriberto and/or
García González,
José Luis “El
Ricochet”

Gulf Cartel Auditor for
San Luis Potosi (SLP),
Aguascalientes, and
Zacatecas; captured with
three comrades.

Dec. 29; captured
Saltillo, COAH.

Army

Acosta Saucedo,
Julio
Arturo Acosta
Vargas,
Julio Arturo

Los Zetas; assassins of
Marine Melquisedet Angulo
Córdova.

Dec. 22; captured
Villahermosa,
TAB.

Army

Rodríguez Trejo
Emilio
and/or Avendaño
Rivera,
Pedro “El Pery”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief in
Coatzacoalcos, VC;
captured with 11
accomplices.

Dec. 10: captured
Coatzacoalcos,
VC.

Army

Altuzar Cortez, Fred
“El Negro”

Gulf Cartel; active in
Mexico-Guatemala frontier.

Oct. 29; captured
Chicomuselo,
CHIS.

Army

Leader

Cartel

2010 (cont.)
Estrada Sánchez,
José
Antonio “El Cuevo”
and
Lara Hernández,’
Julio
César “El Piñata”
Salazar Rodríguez,
Jesús Alejandro “El
Tin”
Simental García,
Teodoro "El Tio"

Los Zetas
Palenque, CHIS.

2009

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
10

Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Nava Valencia,
Óscar
Orlando “El Lobo”

Valencia Cartel; close to
Ignacio Coronel Villarreal.

Oct. 28; captured
Guadalajara, JAL.

Army

Ramos Garza,
Pedro
“El Güero"

N.A.

Oct. 5: captured
San Pedro Garza
García, NL.

Army

Ruiz Tlapanco,
Sergio
Enrique “El Tlapa”
and
Domínguez Macías,
Ana
Georgina “La Conta
Gina”

Gulf Cartel
money handlers.

Leader
2009 (cont.)

Hernández del Real,
Gerardo “El
Moreno”

Sept. 8; captured
Coatzacoalcos,
VC.

Army

Juárez Cartel/La
Línea gang.

Sept. 1; captured
Ciudad (Cd.)
Juárez, Chihuahua
(CHIH).

Army

Carranco Salazar
Juan
Daniel “El Colosio”

Gulf Cartel

Aug. 8: captured
Cancún, QR.

Federal Police/Army

Romo Alcaraz,
Guillermo “El
Meme”

AFO

July 25: captured
Tijuana, BC.

Army

Jurado Zarzoza,
Juan
Manuel “El
Puma”/“El R”

Gulf Cartel Cancún Plaza
chief captured with three
accomplices.

June 12: captured
Cancún, QR.

Army

Parra Ramos, José
Filberto “La Perra”

Ex-AFO; aligned with
Teodoro García Simental.

June 11: captured
Tijuana, BC.

Army and Navy

Cárdenas Medina,
Mario Alberto “El
Betillo”

Gulf Cartel; nephew of
Osiel Cárdenas Guillén.

June 9; captured
Matamoros,
TAMPS.

Army

Gulf Cartel

June 1; captured
Monterrey, NL.

Federal Police/Army

Sinaloa Cartel lieutenant
in Culiacan.

May 29: captured
Culiacán, SIN.

Army

Arteaga, Sergio
Raúl
“El Cococho”
Beltrán Burgos,
Roberto “El Doctor”

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
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Leader

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Cartel

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

2009 (cont.)
Camacho Pérez,
Félix
Or Hernández
González
José “El Boti”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief
Cancún, QR.

Garza Lozano,
Nelson
“El Luchador”

Gulf Cartel Plaza chief in
Cd. Victoria, TAMPS.

May 26: captured
Cancún, QR.

Army

May 20: captured
Ciudad Victoria,
TAMPS.

Tabasco
Ministerial Police

Godoy Castro, Isaac
Manuel “Dany” or
“Martín”

AFO captured with six
accomplices.

April 21: captured
Tijuana, BC.

Army: Assistant
Attorney General's
Office for Special
Investigations on
Organized Crime
(SIEDO)

Granados Vargas,
Rubén “El Nene”

BLO

April 13: captured
San Luís la Loma,
Guerrero (GRO).

Army

Carrillo Leyva,
Vicente

Juárez Cartel

April 2: captured
DF.

Federal Police

Huerta Ríos, Héctor
“La Burra”/“El
Junior”

BLO; active in Monterrey.

March 24:
captured
Monterrey, NL.

Army Special Forces

Nájera Talamantes,
Sigifredo “El
Canicón”

Los Zetas

March 20:
captured
Saltillo, COAH.

Army; SIEDO

Zambada Niebla,
Vicente “El
Vincentillo”

Sinaloa Cartel; son of
Ismael Zambada García.

March 18;
captured
DF.

Army

Mendoza Aguirre,
Napoleón de Jesús
“El
Napo”

Gulf Cartel

March 12:
captured
Cancún, QR.

Federal Policy/Army

Farías Álvarez, Juan
José “El Abuelo”

La Familia Michoacán

March 4; captured
Tepalcatepec,
MICH.

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
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Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Gulf Cartel

Feb. 9: captured
Cancún, QR.

BLO

Jan. 6; captured
Tlapa de
Comonfort,
GRO.

Army

Espinosa Barrón,
Alberto
“La Fresa”

La Familia Michoacán

Dec. 29; captured
Morelia, MICH

Army

Romero de los
Santos,
Luis Antonio “El
Chavo”

BLO; captured with several
accomplices.

Dec. 23; captured
Zihuatanejo, GRO.

Army

Díaz Ramón, Javier
“El Java Díaz”

Gulf Cartel

Dec. 22; captured
Veracruz, VC.

Army

Leader
2009 (cont.)
Almanza Morales,
Octavio “Gori 4”
Narro
López, Ashly
“Comandante
Bonbón”
Rivera García,
Adrián
“El Primo Rivera”
2008

González Durán,
Jaime
“El Hummer”

Los Zetas

Nov. 7; captured
Reynosa, TAMPS.

Grupo Especial
De Operaciones
(GOPES) Public
Security Ministry
(SSP)

Arellano Félix,
Eduardo

AFO

Oct. 26; captured,
DF.

Army

Zambada Reyes,
Jesús
“El Rey”

BLO

Oct. 22; captured
DF.

Federal Police

Arellano Félix,
Eduardo
“El Doctor”

Tijuana Cartel/AFO

Oct. 25; captured
Tijuana.

Federal Police and
Army (Special
Forces)

Sánchez Arras,
Pedro
“El Tigre”

Juárez Cartel; important
lieutenant.

May 17; captured
DF.

Army

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
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Cartel

Date and Place
Captured/Killed

Agency
Responsible
for the Take-Down

Díaz Cellar, Rogelio
or
Díaz Contreras
Rogelio
“El Rojo"/"El Roger”

Gulf Cartel
Plaza chief in Cd.
Victoria, TAMPS.

April 24; captured
Cd. Victoria,
TAMPS.

Army/Federal Police

Peña Mendoza,
Sergio
“El Concord”

Gulf Cartel

March 14;
captured
Reynosa, TAMPS.

Federal Police

Araujo Ávila,
Alfredo
“El Popeye”

AFO

Jan. 25; Tijuana,
BC

Army

Beltrán Leyva,
Héctor
Alfredo “El
Mochomo”

BLO

Jan. 21; captured
Culiacan, SIN.

Army/Federal Police

De la Cruz Reyna,
Juan Carlos “JC”

Los Zetas

Aug. 28: captured
DF.

Army/SIEDO

Reyes Enriquez,
Luis
“El Rex”/”Z-12”

Los Zetas

June 16; captured
Atotonilco El
Grande, HGO.

Army/SIEDO

Gallegos Alemán,
Jorge Alberto de
Jesús

Gulf Cartel Captured with
12 accomplices.

June 14: captured
Torreón, COAH.

Federal Police/Army

Colín Ortega,
Alfredo
“El Gordo”

AFO

June 8: captured
La Paz, BCS.

Army

Vargas García,
Nabor
“El Debora”

Los Zetas

April 18: captured
Ciudad del
Carmen, QR.

Army/SIEDO

Leader
2008 (cont.)

2007

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
Note: I am indebted to Nicole K. Shuman, a rising Senior at the
College of William & Mary, for incredible assistance with this and
other figures.
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Sources: “Javier Torres Félix, Operaba en Sinaloa and está considerado al nivel del ‘Chapo’ Guzmán o ‘El Mayo Zambada’”
(“Javier Torres Félix Operates in Sinaloa and is Considered at
the Level of ‘Chapo’ Guzmán or ‘El Mayo Zambada’,”), Esmas,
January 27, 2004; “Cae operador de Los Zetas en Tamaulipas”
(“Zeta Operator Falls in Tamaulipas”), El Universal March 14,
2009; “Los grandes capos del Narcotráfico que faltan por caer”
(“The Large Narco-trafficking Capos Who Remain at Large”), El
Universal, August 31, 2010; “Destaca 2010 como año productivo
en caída de capos” (“2010 Stands Out as a Productive Year in the
Fall of Capos”), El Universal, December 2, 2010; “Policías estatales
detienen a presunto reclutador de ‘Zetas’ en Hidalgo” (“State Police Detain Suspected ‘Zeta’ Recruiter in Hidalgo”), CNNMéxico,
November 22, 2011; “Capturados y presentadas” (“Captured
and Arraigned, November of 2011”), Terra, November 25, 2011;
“Detienen a Ezequiel Cárdenas Rivera ‘El Junior’,” hijo de ‘Tony
Tormenta’” (“Ezequiel Cárdenas Rivera ‘El Junior,’ son of Tony
Tormenta’ Detained”), Univisión Noticias, November 29, 2011; Los
10 capos mexicanos que cayeron en el 2011” (“The 10 Mexican Capos Who Fell in 2011”), CNN en Español, December 31, 2011; “Cae
capo; lo ligan a 50 muertes” (“Capo Falls Who Was Linked to 50
Murders”), Reforma, January 13, 2012; and “Detienen a líderes, armament y droga” (“Leaders Arrested with Arms and Drugs”), Reforma, January 22, 2012; “Capturan a líder de Zetas en La Laguna”
(“Zeta Leader in La Laguna” Captured”), Reforma, March 9, 2012;
“El Ejército detiene al presunto líder del Cártel de Jalisco” (Army
Captures Presumed Leader of Jalisco Carte”), CNNMéxico, March
9, 2012; “Desata bloqueos captura de capo” (“Road Blocks Broken
. . . Capo Captures”), Reforma, March 10, 2012; “Mexico: el Ejército detiene a jefe de Los Zetas en región del norte” (“Mexico: the
Army Arrests Zeta Chief in Northern Region”), Infolatam, March
11, 2012; “Capturan en Jalisco a otro líder del cártel” (“Another
Cartel Leader Captured in Jalisco”), Reforma, March 19, 2012;
“Achacan a golpe de suerte la caída de ‘El Quemado’” (“Lucky
Break Leads to Fall of ‘The Burned One’”), Reforma, April 6, 2012;
Rubén Mosso, “Aprende Marina a 10 ’matazetas’ en Veracruz”
(“Marines Capture 10 ‘Zeta-Killers’ in Veracruz”), Milenio, April
16, 2012; “Cae Edil panistas con jefe de zetas” (“PAN Mayor
Falls with Chief of Zetas”), Reforma, April 19, 2012; Roberto Sosa,
“Ejército detiene a jefe de sicarios” (The Army Detains Boss of
Gunmen”), Diario Xalapa, April 25, 2012; “Detienen con droga a
sobrinos del ‘Mayo,’” (“Nephews of del “Mayo” Captured with
Drugs,” Reforma, April 27, 2012; “Captura Semar a jefe ‘Zeta’ en
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Veracruz” (“Navy Captured ‘Zeta’ Chief in Veracruz”), Reforma,
May 4, 2012; Con captura de El Loco termina un reinado de terror
en Cadereyta” (“The Arrest of El Loco Ends a Reign of Terror in
Cadereyta”), Excélsior, May 12, 2012; Raúl Flores, “Cae El Chilango, zeta viculado a muerte de 4 marinos” (“Arrested Mexico City
Resident Tied to Death of Four Marines”), Excélsior, May 12, 2012;
Arrested “Detienen a capo rival de La Barbie”) “Capo Who Was
La Barbie’s Rival Arrested”), Blureport, June 7, 2012; “Cae líder de
Zetas en sureste del País” (“Zeta Leader in Southeast of Country
Falls”), Reforma, July 27, 2012; and various press bulletins from the
Attorney General of Mexico (PGR) and SEDENA.

Figure 1. Major Capos Arrested/Killed, cont.
During the conflict, the Army has suffered kidnappings and deaths of its own elements, as reported in
Figure 2.
Year

Deaths

Wounded

Kidnappings

2011

22 (Through
May 18)

59 (Through
December 7)

2010

88

69

2009

44

34

2008

54

28

2007

22

6

Total

267

744

196

Source: Benito Jiménez, “Crecen levantones . . . pero de militaries” (“Kidnappings Increase . . . but of Military Personnel”),
Reforma, January 2, 2012; “Mueren 18 sicarios por cada militar”
(“18 Gunmen Killed for Each Member of the Military”), Reforma,
December 20, 2011; Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (Estado
Mayor).

Figure 2. Deaths, Woundings, and Kidnappings
of Army Personnel, 2007-December 2011.
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Law Enforcement.
Various states and large cities have recruited exmembers of the armed forces to fill traditional civilian posts in law enforcement—appointments usually
recommended and approved by National Defense
Secretary Guillermo Galván Galván. Figure 3 illustrates this phenomenon. The number of military men
in these roles has risen from six in February 2009 to 36
in April 2012, with six officers in charge of state police forces. Of the 12 governors elected in 2010, seven
opted to install a general at the head of the State Security Ministry: Carlos Lozano de la Torre (Aguascalientes), Roberto Borge Angulo (Quintana Roo), Mario
López Valdéz (Sinaloa), Egidio Torre Cantú (Tamaulipas), Mariano González Zarur (Tlaxcala), Javier Duarte de Ochoa (Veracruz), and Miguel Alonso Reyes
(Zacatecas).
State/
Municipality

Position

Incumbent

Date Appointed

Col. (Ret.) Manuel Paz Espinosa
Acapulco
(Guerrero)

Secretary of Public
Security

Aguascalientes

Secretary of Public
Security

Armería
Colima

Director of
Municipal Police

Gen. (Ret.) Héctor Paulino
Vargas López (took over after
Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Serafín
Valdéz Martínez resigned on
Feb. 16, 2010)

Late July 2011

Civilian
Div. Gen. (Ret.) Rolando
Eugenio Hidalgo Eddy
Capt. (Ret.) Jorge Mario
Mercado Larios

Oct. 6, 2008

Feb. 3, 2011

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts
as of January 1, 2012.
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State/
Municipality

Position

Incumbent

Date Appointed

Director of State
Ministerial Police

Brig Gen. Florencio Raúl
Cuevas Salgado; former commander 2nd Military Zone
headquartered in Tijuana

Director of State
Preventative Police

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Eusebio Alecio
Villatoro Córtez

Feb. 20, 2009

Director of Transit

Rear Adm. Saúl Cotarelo Díaz

Jan. 23, 2012

Chiapas

Secretary of Public
Security

Maj. Rogelio Hernández
de la Mata

Dec. 30, 2010

Chihuahua

Director General of
Unified State Police

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Julián David
Rivera Bretón

Oct. 3, 2010

Director of Public
Security

Lt. Col. Julián Leyzaola Pérez*

March 10, 2011

Police Chief

Div. Gen. Julián David
Rivera Bretón

March 16,2009

Director of
Security
Operations

Col. (Ret.) Alfonso Cristóbal
García Melgar

March 16, 2009

First Capt. Rafael Lomelí
Martínez

April 18, 2011

Gen. (Ret.) Ubaldo Ayala Tinoco

Jan. 1, 2011

Director General of
State
Investigative Police

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Jesús Ernesto
Estrada Bustamante

Aug. 12, 2008

Undersecretary of
Prevenion and
Social
Readaptation

Gen. José Luis García
Dorantes

Feb. 24, 2009

Baja California

Boca del Río
Veracruz

Ciudad Juárez

Chief of Public
Ciudad Victoria, Security
Tamaulipas
Chief of Public
Security

Coahuila

March 27,
2008

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont.
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State/
Municipality

Colima

Position

Incumbent

Date Appointed

Chief of the State
Preventative Police
(Equivalent to
Secretary
of Public
Security)

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Raúl Pinedo
Dávila

Dec. 6, 2010

Coordinator of
Intelligence
in the Center of
Control,
Command,
Computation,
and Communications (C-4)

Adm. Andrés Humberto Cano

Dec. 6, 2010

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Florencio Raúl
Cuevas Salgado

Sept. 21, 2011

Ensenada, BC

Commissioner
(in charge
of security and
Director
of Municipal Police)

Federal District

Secretary of Public
Security

Gómez Palacio
(Durango)

Director of
Municipal
Public Security
Secretary of Public
Security

Div. Gen. Juan Heriberto
Salinas Altés (Ret.); former
Army Chief of Staff
Rear-Adm. Manuel Mondragón
Y Kalb (Physician)
Lt. Col. (Ret.) Antonio
Horacio Ramírez Morales

First Sgt. (Ret.) Florencio Santos
Hernández

Coordinator of C-4

Capt. (Ret.) Alejandro Almazán
Hernández

Coordinator of
Recruitment,
Instruction, and
Training

Feb. 14, 2008

Col. (Ret.) Enrique Alberto
Sanmiguel Sánchez

Director of Police
Guadalupe
(Nuevo León)

April 1, 2011

April 6, 2011

Paymaster (Ret.) Hermelindo Aquileo
Sánchez Castellanos

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont.
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State/
Municipality

Guanajuato

Matamoros
(Tamaulipas)

Michoacán

Position

Date Appointed

Civilian Ramón Almonte
Borje, who promised to promote
tourism in by hiring 18- to 25year-old female cops dressed in
sexy uniforms for beach patrol
duties in Acapulco

April 1, 2011

Div. Gen. Juan Heriberto
Salinas Altés (Ret.)

April 1, 2005
to April 1, 2011

Secretary of Public
Security

Lt. Col. Gabriel López Ordaz

Jan. 18, 2011

Operations
Director of
Secretary of Public

Lt. Rafael Antonio Huerta
Méndez

Jan. 18, 2011

Security
Director of Transit

Lt. Roberto Guerrero Roldán

Jan. 18, 2011

Secretary of Public
Security

Div. Gen. (Ret.) Manuel
García Ruiz

Aug. 8, 2010

Coordinator of
State
Preventative Police

Capt. (2nd) Manuel García
Ruiz

Oct. 26, 2010

Gen. (Ret.) José Pablo Leonel
Vargas Martínez

Jan. 4, 2012.

Div Gen. (Ret.) Gilberto
Toledano Sánchez**

April 10, 2011

Div. Gen (Ret.) Gastón
Menchaca Arias, former commander of 10th Military
Region (Yucatán)

May 17, 2009

Secretary of Public
Security and Civil
Protection

Monterrey

Morelos

Incumbent

Secretary of Public
Security

Nuevo Laredo

Secretary of Public
Security

Brig. Gen. (Active) Manuel
Farfán Carreola

Jan. 1, 2011

Nuevo León

Secretary of Public
Security

Div. Gen. Jaime Castañeda
Bravo

Feb. 3, 2011

Oaxaca

Secretary of Citizen
Protection

Puebla

Secretary of Public
Security

Lt. Col. (Ret.) Javier Rueda
Velásquez
Div. Gen. Mario Ayón
Rodríguez (Ret.); former
director-general of personnel
for National Defense Ministry

March 31, 2008

March 1, 2005

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont.
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State/
Municipality
Querétaro

Position
Secretary of Public
Security

Incumbent

Date Appointed

Capt. Adolfo Vega Montoto

Oct. 4, 2009

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Carlos
Bibiano Villa Castillo***

April 5, 2011

Secretary of Public
Security

Vice Adm. Miguel Ángel Ramos
(Replaced Salvador Rocha Vargas
who was arrested on charges of
cooperating with drug traffickers)

Sept. 4, 2009

Secretary of Public
Security

Maj. (Ret.) Magdaleno
Vázquez Ruiz

Nov. 26, 2010

Director General
of the
Municipal
Preventative
Police

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Marco
Antonio Delgado Talavera

Jan 29, 2009

San Luis Potosí

Secretary of Public
Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Heliodoro
Guerrero

Jan. 15, 2011

Tabasco

Acting Secretary of
Public Security

Maj. (Ret.) Sergio López Uribe

Feb. 1, 2009

Tamaulipas

Secretary of Public
Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Ubaldo Ayala
Tinoco

Dec. 30, 2010

Tijuana, BC

Municipal
Secretary of
Public Security

First Capt. (Ret.) Gustavo
Huerta Martínez****

Nov. 26, 2010

Tlaxcala

Secretary of Public
Security

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) Valentín
Romano López *****

Jan. 15, 2011

Secretary of Public
Security

Lt. Arturo Bermúdez Zurita
******

July 3. 2011

Quintana Roo

Rosarito, BC
Saltillo
(Coahuila)

Veracruz
Rear Adm. Rodolfo Pallares
Herrán

Feb. 23, 2012

Secretary of Public
Security

Gen. (Ret.) Jesús Pinto Ortiz

Sept. 11, 2010

Director of State
Preventative Police

Gen. (Ret.) Víctor Manuel
Bosque Rodríguez

Nov. 3, 2010

Director of Public
Transit

Zacatecas

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts, cont.
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Notes:
* Leyzaola replaced Col. Laurencio Rodríguez.
** Replaced Div. Gen. (Ret.) Gastón Menchaca Arias (14 days
after seven people were killed in the state, including the son of
writer and social activist Javier Sicilia.
*** Bibiano replaced Vice-Adm. Miguel Ángel Ramos Real.
**** Replaced Lt. Col. (Ret.) Julián Leyzaola Pérez, who became secretary of public security in Ciudad Juárez.
***** Replaced Div. Gen. José Leopoldo Martínez González
(Ret).
****** Replaced Div. Gen. Sergio López Esquer: former zone
commander for the states of Coahuila, Baja California, Baja California Sur, and Veracruz.
Sources: Jésica Zermeño, “Toman generales mandos policiacos”
(“Generals Assume Police Responsibilities”), Reforma, February
15, 2009; Jésica Zermeño et al. “Optan estados por mando militar”
(“States Opt for Military Leaders”), Reforma, February 15, 2009;
"Encabezan los hermanos Ayón Rodríguez mandos policiacos en
el país” (“Brothers Ayón Rodríguez Lead Military Posts in the
Country”), E-consulta, February 15, 2009; “Gastón Menchaca, de
Yucatán a Morelos, siempre en acción” (“Gastón Menchaca, from
Yucatán to Morelos, Always in Action”), NotiSureste.com.mx, May
17, 2009; Silvia Hernández, “Nombran a militar titular de SSP en
Q. Roo” (“Military Man Named Head of Public Security Ministry in Quintana Roo), El Universal, September 5, 2009; Roberto
Aguilar, “Torre Cantú nombra a general titular de la SSP” (“Torre
Cantú Names General as Head of Public Safety Ministry”), El Universal.com.mx, December 31, 2010; Mauro de la Fuente, “Asume
militares policía de Matamoros” (“Military Officers Take Control
of Police in Matamoros”), Reforma.com, January 19, 2011; “Nombran a militar titular de policía de Armería, Colima” (“Military
Man Named Head of Police in Armería, Colima”), Guerra Contra
el Narco, February 4, 2011; Juan Cedillo, “NL: general asume cargo
de titular de Seguridad” (“Nuevo León: General Assumes Head
of Public Safety”), El Universal.com.mx, February 5, 2011; Óscar
Guadarrama, “El gobernador de Morelos cesa al secretario de Seguridad pública” (“Morelos Governor Fires Secretary of Public
Security”), CNN México, April 10, 2011; Andro Aguilar, “Militarización sin resultados” (“Militarization without Results”), Reforma (“Enfoque”), April 10, 2011 (the author relied heavily on
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this source); Édgar Ávila Pérez, “Arturo Bermúdez Zurita fue
designado a la dependencia luego de la renuncia del general Sergio López Esquer” (“Arturo Bermúdez Zurita Was Designated
as Head of Ministry after General Sergio López Esquer Stepped
Down”), El Universal, July 3, 2011; and “Toma General mando
de la Policía regia” (“General Takes Over Nuevo León Police”),
Reforma, January 4, 2012; and “Asumen marinos Tránsito en Veracruz” (“Marines Assume Control of Transit in Veracruz”), Reforma, January 23, 2012.

Figure 3. Military Personnel in Public Safety Posts,
cont.
Meanwhile, men with military backgrounds hold
the position of the secretaries of public security in 36
percent of the municipalities with the most homicides
in the country, according to the National System of
Public Security. Retired generals have assumed this
role in the five cities that have registered the most killings: Acapulco, Chihuahua, Ciudad, Juárez, Culiacán,
and Tijuana. On January 13, 2011, nine retired officers were named chiefs of nine municipalities in wartorn Tamaulipas: Altamira, Ciudad Victoria, Madero,
Mante, Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo, Reynosa, Río Bravo, and Tampico.
While by no means new to Mexico, this approach
appeared to offer several advantages. First, the military men fill a void opened by the execution or resignation of 19 state and municipal security chiefs in dangerous posts. Three officials stepped down in Nuevo
León municipalities: Allende, and Linares; another
five civilians died at the hands of narco-traffickers.
Second, many of the officers selected have commanded one or more of the Army’s 12 regions and/
or 45 zones, and boast years of experience struggling
against drug mafias. Third, they are likely to have
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ties to—and the confidence of—current regional and
zonal military chiefs with whom they often coordinate assaults on DTOs. Fourth, whether retired or on
leave, military officers may be familiar with the tactics
of Los Zetas, the original contingent of which served
in the Army’s elite Special Forces Airmobile Group.
General Rolando Eugenio Hidalgo Heddy, Public Security Secretary in Aguascalientes, headed these commandos. Nuevo León’s safety chief, Jaime Castañeda
Bravo, had previously served on SEDENA’s general
staff, headed armored regiments, and functioned as
commander of the 38th and 43rd Military Zones.7
Fifth, generals, admirals, colonels, and majors have
emerged from a culture of discipline that needs to be
inculcated in civilian police.8 Members of police forces
have often acted in a venal, free-wheeling manner—to
the point that thousands of serious kidnappings and
other felonies go unreported because many citizens
believe that the cops are in league with the miscreants. Even if military leaders cannot change behavior,
they can oust incompetents and malefactors. For instance, General Salinas Altés removed 200 elements of
Acapulco’s Municipal Preventive Police when he took
over as security boss in Guerrero, a poverty-stricken
state plagued by lawlessness. Soon after becoming
security chief in Monterrey, General José Pablo Leonel
Vargas Martínez arrested 106 policemen and prosecutors who were accused of “halconeo”—that is, acting as
“falcons” or lookouts for cartels.9
Sixth, officers are in a good position to recruit
active-duty or retired members of the armed forces
as policemen in the jurisdictions that they serve. Seventh, every public-opinion survey shows that the
armed forces enjoy a much better reputation than do
the police. Such praise centers on their efforts in di-
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saster relief, as well as their anti-crime missions. As
one anonymous source indicated, “even if military security chiefs are as corrupt as their civic counterparts,
they give a psychological lift to the public.”
Finally, in light of the relatively low pensions received by retired officers, assuming a civilian post
supplements their income and reduces pressure to
increase retirement income. Overall security expenditures have sky-rocketed; and Mexico’s Finance Ministry reported that the military budget shot up 74.2
percent between 2007 (MEX$ 32,200 billion) and 2012
(MEX$ 55,610 billion).10
Preliminary Results.
How have the officers in mufti fared? Upon taking office, retired generals, colonels, or captains often
clashed with local police forces, especially when they
attempted to cleanse their ranks. In fact, as described
in Figure 4, by November 2009, military units had
clashed with local, state, or federal law enforcement
agencies at least 65 times—up from two confrontations in 2008.11 After all, Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Cartel,
the Knights Templars, and other cartels often demand
the appointment of a “reliable” security chief in municipalities that lie along trafficking routes. Soon after reaching Tijuana to head the municipal police on
March 10, 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Julián Leyzaola
Pérez oversaw the dismissal or resignation of 600 law
enforcement agents, including 84 who were arrested
for allegedly cooperating with organized crime. Meanwhile, 2,325 people, among them 43 policemen, died
during these 3 years. The crime rate did fall on his
watch due to a confluence of factors: the city’s population is relatively compact; Governor José Guadalupe
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Osuna Millán (2007-13) cooperated in the fight against
DTOs; and the increasing dominance of the Sinaloa
Cartel, which supplanted the Arellano Félix Organization, contributed to stabilizing the sprawling border
city. The drop in violence aside, the state human rights
commission and the National Human Rights Commission charged the police chief with torture before
the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. In
addition, the nongovernmental organization (NGO),
Human Rights Watch, criticized Leyzaola for 390 disappearances, including four young tiajuaneses.
Date/Place
January 4, 2011
San Nicolás, NL

Police Agency
Municipal
Police

MilitaryAgency

Nature of Conflict

Outcome
Three military personnel were hurt; one
civilian killed.

Army

Police officers helped members of crime
group escape by obstructing the
military chasing the armed suspects.

Not Available

March 25, 2011
San Luis Potosí

Municipal
Police

Army

Mexican Army detained three police officers San Luis Potosí Direção-Geral dos
Serviços Prisionais (DGSP) for involvement in a robbery of two civilians; police
allegedly took 32,330,000 pesos.

November 22,
2010
Apodaca, NL

Municipal
Police

Marines

Suspicious activities led Marines to
investigate police officers.

Three outlaws and
four policemen were
arrested.

October 26,
2010
Monterrey, NL

Municipal
Police

Army

The Army stopped to investigate four
policemen from Monterrey accused of
following the military personnel of the
Public Security Ministry and the Federal
Investigative Agency.

Only one policeman
was taken into custody
because he was carrying illegal radio
equipment.

October 3, 2010
Monterrey, NL

Municipal
Police

Army

Army investigated Guadalupe police
for helping criminals escape after they
threw a grenade into the city’s main
plaza.

Twelve people hurt.

August 20,
2010
Santiago, NL

Municipal
Police

Police accused of spying on, kidnapping, and killing Mayor Edelmiro
Cavazos Leal.

Six municipal police
arrested.

July 29, 2010
Veracruz

Municipal
Police

Federal judge in Veracruz ordered
military to arrest 40 municipal police officers, 16 ministerial officers, and 6 former law enforcement officials suspected
of involvement in organized crime.

Army

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes
between Military and Civilian Police.
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Date/Place

January 13,
2010
Monterrey, NL

Police Agency

Municipal and
State Police

MilitaryAgency

Nature of Conflict

Army

Policeman arrested for supposed
involvement in a kidnapping; after his
incarceration, the suspected sought
help from fellow officers, who stopped
the Army from taking the detainee to a
military facility.

After exchanging
verbal insults and a
nearly 5-hour traffic
stoppage, state police
allowed the municipal
officer to be taken to
the Attorney General’s
Office (PGR); after the
incident the, Nuevo
León Secretary General Javier Treviño,
claimed that the state
police arrived to support the military.
One police officer
tried to flee the scene
and was shot in the
leg by a soldier and
transported to military
camp; three police officers arrested a couple
of days later.
Municipal cop incarcerated for not having
proper ID.

August 31,
2009
Monterrey, NL

Municipal
Police

Army

Municipal police accused of supporting
criminal; Army detained an armed man
with drugs; law enforcement officers
interfered with troops transporting
suspect to a military camp.

September 2,
2009
Monterrey, NL

Municipal
Police
State and
Federal

Army

After an incident in August, military
inspected documents of law enforcement agent.

Municipal
Police

Army

Army took away firearms from police
employed by the local Public Security
Ministry.

Army

Army arrested 27 police officers from
Yuatepec, including the secretary of
Public Security; believed to be protecting drug sellers.

Army

Police officers and military officers
found associated with the Gulf Cartel;
the Assistant Attorney General for Specialized Investigation of Organized Crime
(SIEDO) in DF stepped in to investigate
the situation.

June 16, 2009
San Pedro de la
Garza, NL
May 9, 2009
Cuernavaca,
Morelos

May 5, 2009
Aguascalientes

Municipal
Police

Municipal
Police

Outcome

Six policemen and 12
military men arrested.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes
between Military and Civilian Police, cont.
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Date/Place

April 13, 2008
Municipal of
Monterrey and
Escobedo, NL

April 8, 2008
Ciudad Juarez

June 6, 2007
Mexicali, BC
international
airport

Police Agency

State Police

Municipal
police

PFP
(Federal Preventive Police)

MilitaryAgency

Nature of Conflict

Outcome

Army

The local police sought to thwart an
inquiry sparking a fight in Escobedo;
on a different occasion, state police resisted an investigation and surrounded
four military units in Monterrey.

Six injured; during the
second encounter,
four police suffered
injuries; some state
police were arrested;
an arrangement allowed release of the
police officers; as the
military left the scene,
police officers yelled
insults. Police officers
were later taken into
custody and handed
over to a military
court.

Army

Army shot at a police vehicle after it
failed to stop for inspection; police
were attending to an emergency; Army
arrested municipal cop.

One police officer
received a gun shot
in the head and was
in critical condition;
the other two officers
disappeared.

Army

Military took control of the airport; PFP
agents had allowed a smuggler to bring
26 kilograms of cocaine into the country; 14 people were investigated.

The military arrested
seven officials of the
PFP and three agents
of the National Migration Institute (INM);
suspects turned over
to SIEDO.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes
between Military and Civilian Police, cont.
Sources: “Ejército detiene a tres policías de SLP” (“Army Detains
Three Police in SLP”), El Universal, March 25, 2011; “Narcobloqueos en cuatro municipios de Nuevo León por la detención de
un capo” (“Blockades by Municipal Police in Four Nuevo León
Municipalities to Arrest Capo”), La Jornada, November 22, 2010;
“Ejército Mexicano detiene a 27 policías en Morelos” (“The Mexican Army Detains 27 Police Officers in the State of Morelos”), Televisa, May 9, 2009; “Ejército retira armas a policías de San Pedro
Garza, NL” (“Army Takes Firearms Away from Police Officers
of San Pedro Garza, NL”), Televisa, June 16, 2009; “Ejército revisa
armas de 500 policías en NL” (“Army Inspects Firearms of 500 Po-
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lice Officers in NL”), El Universal, November 28, 2011; “Policías y
Militares se enfrentan en Nuevo León” (“Police and Soldiers Confront each Other in Nuevo León”), El Universal, January 13, 2010;
“‘Cacería’ de policías espías en la metrópoli” (“Hunt for Spying
Police Officers in the City”), revistacodigo21 (magazine), October
26, 2010; “Investigan a policías por narcoterrorismo en Guadalupe; se recuperan heridos en granadazo” (“Police Investigated
for Narcoterrorism in Guadalupe, Injured Recover After Granade
Explosion”), revistacodigo21 (magazine), October 3, 2010; “Confirman autoridades detención de 56 policías” (“Authorities Confirm
Detention of 56 Officers”), El Mexicano, July 29, 2010; “Reportan
balacera entre policías y militares en Nuevo León” (“Shootout between Police Officers and Military Soldiers Reported in Nuevo
León”), El Informador, August 31, 2009; “Controlan los ‘Zetas’ a
la policía de Aguascalientes,” (“The Zetas Control the Police in
Aguascalientes”), Entre Lineas, May 5, 2009, “Enfrentamiento entre militares y policías en Monterrey deja seis heridos,” (“Confrontation Between Military and Police in Monterrey Leaves Six
Wounded”), Chihuahua al Instante, April 13, 2008; “Militares balean a policías de Ciudad Juárez,” (“Military Shoot Police in Ciudad Juárez”), La Jornada, April 8, 2008; and “Arraigan a agentes
federales adscritos al aeropuerto de Mexicali,” (“Federal Agents
Assigned to Mexicali Airport Detained”), La Jornada, June 6, 2007.

Figure 4. Examples of Clashes
between Military and Civilian Police, cont.
“The case of Julián Leyzaola is a rare mirage in
which tough action in response to a security crisis has
other costs: human rights’ abuses. He has transgressed
the fundamental principle of democracy whereby civil
authority must control the military,” stated Erubiel Tirado Cervantes, a security specialist at Mexico City’s
These accusations
IberoAmerican University.12
did not prevent the convulsed city of Ciudad Juárez
from hiring Leyzaola as its public security secretary
on October 10, 2011, in a latter-day example of a sheriff facing desperados at High Noon. In this office, he
leads a force of 1,800 police, working in six crime-rid29

den districts where 456 murders had been recorded by
June 1, 2011. Almost a year later, Calderón announced
a 60 percent fall in homicides as drug-related deaths
declined from 300 each month to 120 deaths as part
of the “We are all Juárez” initiative, which involves
economic, social, political, and safety elements.13 No
deaths occurred in early December 2012.
Although conditions vary from state to state, overall the presence of military men in top security roles
has not diminished the violence afflicting their areas
of responsibility (see Figure 5). In view of venal police
forces, governors and mayors may have had no choice
other than to reach into the barracks for public safety
czars. Such appointments also enable state and municipal executives to appear to be “tough on crime”
even as they cut deals with cartels or turn a blind eye
to illegal activities. One problem facing the retired officers is that they assume the civilian position without
the benefit of the staff members who assisted them
when they were on active duty.
When troops attempted to stop a suspicious looking SUV that was being escorted through Monterrey,
they found themselves under fire from state policemen, who enabled the suspects to escape. “The moment they shoot at us, get in our way, use their guns to
protect criminals, they become criminals themselves,”
said General Guillermo Moreno Serrano, the regional
commander in Tamaulipas and Nuevo León, which
lie along the Texas border.14
A WikiLeaks publication of a conversation between
Galván and a U.S. official revealed the defense secretary’s attitude toward the law enforcement agencies. He complained about joint operations with the
police because “leaks of planning and information by
corrupted officials have compromised past efforts.”15
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State

Percentage
Change of
Robberies

Percentage
Change of
Kidnappings

Percentage
Change of
Homicides

Raw Number of
Executions

Aguascalientes

13

-54

1

85

Chiapas

20

92

-6

n.a.

Chihuahua

4

-39

-3

1,008

Coahuila

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Colima

18

518

73

n.a.

Guanajuato

-7

-55

9

128

Michoacán

7

18

46

216

Morelos

7

160

15

433

Nuevo León

12

n.a.

27

n.a.

Querétaro

32

60

28

21

Quintana Roo

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

San Luis Potosí

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Sinaloa

-3

278

1

n.a

Tamaulipas

-3

123

-9

n.a

Tlaxcala

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Veracruz

-37

-100

-37

357

Zacatecas

3

27

17

18

Source: Monthly reports of the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security (SESNSP) as compiled by Andro
Aguilar, “Militarización sin resultados” (“Militarization without
Results”), Reforma (“Enfoque”), April 10, 2011.

Figure 5. Crimes Committed in States
with Military Law Enforcement Chiefs.
Moreover, in Nuevo Laredo, the Los Zetas sadistic
paramilitary cartel hire unofficial “police”—an estimated 3,000 young people—that far outnumber the
regular force. These ubiquitous “spotters,” as local
residents refer to them, prefer crew cuts, adorn themselves with gold chains and earrings, press cellphones
to their ears, and wear shorts below their waists.16
31

Torreón’s muscular Public Security Director Carlos Bibiano Villa Castillo also believes in an ultra hard
line toward law-breakers. A Pancho Villa descendent
and one of 36 children, the retired general told a reporter that he preferred to kill members of organized
crime rather than interrogate them. “I like to feel the
flow of adrenaline. On patrol, when I capture a Zeta
or Chapo, I kill him. Why interrogate him? Here we
beat the hell out of a bad actor. I have no confidence in
the Federal Police because they do not kill [suspects],
only arrest them. The Army and Navy kill them,”
he said 6 days after the March 2, 2011, confrontation
with cartel gun men.17 Either because of or despite his
stance, the mustachioed retired brigadier general was
appointed secretary of public security by Quintana
Roo’s new governor Roberto Borge Ángulo.
Upon leaving Torreón, he emphasized his loyalty:
“my father is the Army, my mother is the Patria,” he
affirmed. He also claimed to have been “sleeping with
the enemy . . . of the 1,100 elements under his command, 1,000 were corrupt; they sold uniforms; they
sold gasoline; even when on patrol they carried out
their dirty business everywhere,” he stated.18 Soon
after arriving in Cancún, a “narco-message” threatened death to the general. It was signed by the “Zetas
Special Forces.”
Militarization Denied.
On May 6, 2011, the federal government launched
a campaign to attract candidates for 422 positions in
a new Accredited State Police (Policía Estatal Acredible [PEA]). “We believe that with your talent, your
ethical integrity, you, young people . . . can contribute to this force that is so important to the Mexican
State . . .” averred ex-Education Secretary and presi32

dential aspirant Alonso Lujambio Irazábal. The students explained their lack of interest in terms of
“corruption,” “bad image,” “fat,” “drug addicts,”
“danger,” and other pejoratives.19
Just as Los Zetas have relied on Guatemala’s
tough-as-nails Kaibiles for training and support, the
Mexican government has backed “Project Sparta,”
which reportedly involves the L-3 MPRI paramilitary
consortium based in Alexandria, Virginia. The respected Reforma newspaper indicated that the corporation has deployed ex-U.S. military personnel, who
will establish 12 “Virtual Military Training Centers”
where they will teach counterinsurgency, urban warfare, infantry tactics, and defense against improvised
explosive devices. When contacted by telephone, Rick
Kiernan, the company’s Senior Vice President of Strategic Communication, denied that his firm had an arrangement with Mexico and that: “There has been no
contract awarded that I know of.”20
Street Patrols.
In addition to naming former armed forces chiefs
to top security posts, mayors and governors are sedulously recruiting new law enforcement officers from
the ranks of military retirees. After purging half of
the city’s 400 policemen in Santa Catarina, a city of
260,000 in metropolitan Monterrey, Mayor Gabriel
Navarro Rodríguez made clear his determination to
hire “elements with a military profile” to undertake
patrol and surveillance duties. In essence, politicians have more confidence in men and women who
have learned discipline, order, and team work in the
armed force.21
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Informal Military-Civilian Groups.
In several areas, local leaders have initiated combined civilian-military groups. For example, at the
naval base in Tapachula, Chiapas, weekly meetings
focused on combating drug crimes include the navy,
army, state attorney general, and elements of the business community. Similarly, in Tijuana and Ensenada,
Baja California, the Army and Navy regularly hold
sessions with representatives of the state government and the tourism sector. Mexico State Governor
Eruviel Ávila Villegas has penned an accord with the
Secretary of Gobernación to establish a coordinating
body formed by the commanders of Military Zones 1
(Tacuba, DF), 22 (Santa María Rayón, Mexico State),
and 37 (Santa Lucia, Mexico State), a representative of
the Attorney General’s Office (PGR), a representative
of Mexico’s version of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the National Security and Investigation Center
(CISEN), along with four state officials: the governor,
secretary of citizen security, government secretary,
and attorney general.22
In other areas, so-called “purple groups” have been
formed, which strive to overcome “stove-piping” by
scheduling regular gatherings of the Army, Navy, and
Federal Police. At land crossings, the Army frequently
cooperates with—or oversees the functions of—Mexican customs agents, who are often subjected to bribes.
“Collateral Damage” and Human Rights Violations.
Professional policemen are taught to separate adversaries, listen to their complaints, negotiate, bargain,
and compromise before using force against trouble-

34

makers. In contrast, soldiers learn to pursue, capture,
and kill. The result is what the Pentagon euphemistically calls “collateral damage”—that is, the inadvertent wounding or killing of innocent civilians. Early
in Calderón’s drug war, NGOs inveighed against the
trampling of human rights in Mexico. They homed in
on the 200,000-member Army, as well as the government’s indifference with respect to the approximately
140,000 migrants apprehended at the country’s border in 2010, not to mention the tens of thousands who
avoided capture. The Mexico’s zealous National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) claimed to have
received 5,055 complaints, many against the military,
during Calderón’s tenure. The same group asserted
that 5,300 people disappeared in this period.23
A statement by the Washington Office on Latin
America epitomized the ever more caustic invective:
For years, organizations and shelters in Mexico
have documented the abuses suffered by migrants
traveling through the country. Every day along the
principal transit routes, migrants, primarily Central
Americans, are beaten, extorted, sexually abused,
and/or kidnapped by criminal groups, at times with
the direct participation or acquiescence of Mexican
authorities.24

The drum beat of international outrage finally
grabbed the attention of Mexico’s brass, who instituted human rights training for soldiers and opened the
door a crack on tribunals before which members of the
armed forces stand trial. In 2008, Mexico’s National
Defense Ministry (SEDENA), created the position of
General Director for Human Rights in its command
structure, “a milestone that passed relatively unno-
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ticed by most media and analysts.”25 In 2011 Mexican
lawmakers approved a new statute that guarantees
the rights of migrants, regardless of their immigration
status. The legislation, whose purpose was to prevent
misconduct toward foreigners, created a 180-day visa
for illegal aliens. The law also called for a new borderpolice force to prevent crimes and conduct surveillance at airports, ports, bus terminals and frontier
areas. How effective this statute will be remains to
be seen.
Pollsters for the Reforma newspaper found that
a majority of citizens (58 percent) and opinion leaders (67 percent) recognized that the Army committed human rights abuses. Indeed, 72 percent of the
latter claimed to have known a crime victim. At the
same time, average people (81 percent) and elites (64
percent) favored deploying the armed forces against
criminal organizations.26
Public Relations: Outreach.
Even though the populace backs its fight against
DTOs, the Army suffered a slight decline in support
for this role—from 83 percent in 2009 to 80 percent
in 2010. In early 2012, 70 percent of respondents to
a Consulta Mitofsky survey favored the military’s continuing to pursue criminal organizations, and 78 percent supported incorporating soldiers into the police.
The results bristled with irony inasmuch as 49 percent
of interviewees called Calderón’s anti-cartel policy
a “failure.”27
Among institutions combatting drug cartels, respondents to a September 2011 National Survey of
Victimization and Perception of Public Security, expressed the greatest confidence in the Navy (51 per-
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cent), followed by the Army (46 percent), the Federal
Police (19 percent), state police (13 percent), the judiciary (11 percent), prosecutors (10 percent), municipal police (8 percent), and transit police (7 percent).
Figure 6 indicates the perceived effectiveness of
these institutions.
Institution

Effectiveness %

Navy

47

Army

43

Federal Police

15

Judiciary

11

Ministerial/Judicial Police

9

State Prosecutors

8

Municipal Preventative Police

5

Transit Police

4

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), reported in “La perception de la inseguridad en México aumentó en
2010: INEGI, (“Perception of Insecurity in Mexico in 2010: INEGI”), CNN México, September 20, 2011.

Figure 6. Effectiveness of Government Agencies
Fighting the Cartels.
As shown in Figure 7, in mid-2012, the Pew
Research Center found that four out of five Mexicans backed using the Mexican Army again DTOs,
although a slight majority (49 to 47 percent) believed
that the government was either losing ground or
making no progress. Those interviewed favored U.S.
training police and military (75 percent) and Washington’s provision of money and weapons (61 percent).
Yet only a third of respondents endorsed the deployment of U.S. troops in their country.28 The Americans
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came out well in areas of cooperation. Enrique Peña
Nieto, candidate of the once-dominant Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI), is now Mexico's new chief
executive. Late in the campaign, he named a tough-asnails Colombian as his security adviser. The selection
of General (Ret.) Oscar Naranjo Trujillo, nemesis of
the Medellín and Cali Cartels and ex-director general
of the Colombian National Police (2007-12), was met
with silence in SEDENA. However, Josefina Vázquez
Mota, candidate of Calderón’s National Action Party,
emphasized her faith in Mexico’s armed forces and
underlined that the country did not require “foreigners” in public safety posts.29
2011
Percent

2012
Percent

Support

83

80

Oppose

14

17

3

3

Making Progress

45

47

Losing Ground

29

30

Same as Past

25

19

1

3

Use of Mexican Army to Fight Drug Traffickers

Don’t Know
Campaign again Drug Traffickers is . . .

Don’t Know

Source: Pew Research Center, “Mexicans Back Military Campaign
against Cartels,” Pew Global Attitudes Project, June 20, 2012.

Figure 7. Mexican Attitudes about Drug War.
To preserve its approval rating, SEDENA and
SEMAR (Navy Ministry) have sought to curry favor
with the population. After the September 16, 2009, Independence Day parade, naval personnel mixed with
the crowd, with la Calle de Sevilla between Reforma
and Avenida Chapultepec in downtown Mexico City
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becoming a “gigantic photography studio.” A mob
of children, men, women, tourists, and whole families
clamored to have their pictures taken with some 200
obliging members of the armed forces and their 40 vehicles. “Look, Papa!” shouted a 9-year-old boy, who
sat proudly in an armored vehicle with both hands
grasping the controls of an anti-aircraft weapon.
What may have begun spontaneously now forms
an integral part of the annual march through the heart
of the capital when the armed services show off their
precision drills, new equipment, and recently acquired
technology. Some youngsters even color their faces
with combat grease and clamp on helmets. During
the bicentennial of independence in 2010, the president announced that the armed forces would present
miniature Mexican flags to every household in the
country to symbolize their unity with the people.30
In early February 2011, the Army and Air Force
again attempted to win friends and influence people.
They sponsored an exposition of “The Great Force of
Mexico” at the old Military College at Popotla, outside of Mexico City. At this event, children and adults
strapped on parachutes, stepped into the cockpits of
helicopters, and mounted Humvee personnel carriers. Some youngsters darkened their faces with cream
worn by soldiers in jungle combat, wriggled into field
jackets, rappelled a low wall, and even took target
practice. “The lack of confidence serious faces inspire
that usually characterizes contacts between civilians
and the military disappeared. Little boys like Fernando enjoyed being made up and being called ‘soldiers.’
Smiles were the common denominator,” according to
a journalist on the scene.31
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In 2011, paratroopers cradling automatic weapons
dropped from 10,000 feet to land in the Plaza of the
Constitution, which is surrounded by the National
Palace; the Finance Ministry; the Antiguo Palacio del
Ayuntamiento, or mayor’s office; hotels; and small
shops. Early in the same year, the Defense Ministry
opened the Campo Militar Número 1 to bicyclists
during the first three Sundays each month. Located
in Mexico City, the expansive facility is headquarters
to the Armed Parachute Brigade, Special Forces, the
Infantry, a tank unit, an Armored Brigade, Military
Police, and the Motorized Cavalry. The facility also
houses the Military Region’s Military Prison, which
had 420 inmates.32 On February 10, 2011, the Air
Force, an arm of the Army, invited spectators to observe from outside its Santa Lucia headquarters, north
of Mexico City, some 71 aircraft. Their pilots planned
to perform aerial acrobats, fly close wing-to-wing formations, and launch air-to-ground missiles. President
Calderón was invited to a luncheon for 2,500 guests
to celebrate the service’s 97th anniversary. Inclement
weather forced cancelation of the exercise, which was
rescheduled.33
To promote both their achievements and recruitment, the Army has hired Servicios Profesionales y
Asistencia Creativa, a Mexico City public relations firm
headed by Alejandro Fernández Carrillo, and McCann
World Group, whose clients include multinational
corporations such as Coca-Cola and the U.S. Army.
As a result, it is running television advertisements,
trumpeting achievements on Twitter and YouTube, and
airing brief recruiting videos before the beginning of
motion pictures. In 2007, SEDENA earmarked 111,246
pesos (approximately $11,000) for promotional activities in the media—with most of the funds dedicated to
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videos and TV and radio commercials. Moreover, the
polling firm of Beltrán y Asociados has conducted survey research. Outlays for these advertising soared to
46 million pesos in 2011 (approximately $3.5 million),
as evidenced in Figure 8.
Year

Outlays on Publicity
(in Pesos)

%
Increase

2007

111,246

2008

47,000,000+

421.49

2009

43,138,000

(8.95)

2010

14,688,000

(193.70)

2011

46,000,000

213.18

Source: Luis Brito, “La SEDENA invierte más en publicidad
para mejorar imagen ante ciudadanos” (“SEDENA Invests
More in Publicity to Improve its Popular Image”), CNN México,
September 7, 2011.

Figure 8. SEDENA’s Expenditures on Publicity.
Acclaimed director Rafael Lara is making a film
depicting the valor of the soldiers in the May 5, 1862,
Battle of Puebla in which General Ignacio Zaragoza
Seguín led the Mexican Army to an unlikely triumph
over the French. SEDENA is assisting the venture
with guidance, vintage uniforms, and extras.34 They
have also publicized athletic achievements of men
and women in uniform: Corporal Marisol Guadalupe
Romero Rosales (2011 Panamerican Games; runner);
Horacio Nava Reza (2011 Panamerican Games; runner); José Layver Ojeda (2011 Panamerican Games;
runner); and Uriel Avigodor Adriano Ruiz (Tae
Kwon Do).35
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These efforts appeared to have succeeded when
spontaneous applause greeted soldiers who marched
in the September 2011 Independence Day parade.
Earlier in the year, Cardinal Norberto Rivera, the
Archbishop of Mexico City, invited worshippers to
pray for the generals, chiefs, officials, and troops of
the Mexican army, reaffirming their vocation of peace
and assistance to a society that they serve with honor
and loyalty. Meanwhile, he excoriated those who had
“negated the love of God by abusing and mistreating
boys and girls. . .”36
SEDENA’s public relations have not been limited
to the Mexico City area. On October 21, 2011, it opened
a large exposition called “Mexico’s Great Force” (“La
Gran Fuerza de México”), which showed off the daily
activities of the Army and Air Force. Visitors were
especially attracted to an exhibit demonstrating how
trained dogs and horses participate in Plan DN-III-E
disaster relief.
As part of the DN-III-E initiative, launched in 1966,
Army units in the North are rebuilding houses, rendering medical care, and providing dental services.
On a given day in a northern city, Army professionals register 397 medical check-ups, conduct 110 dental examinations, and distribute 847 pharmaceutical
drugs. They also carry out projects involving masons
(112), plumbing (38), electricity (21), carpentry (524),
and haircuts (962). A SEDENA spokesman indicated
that they “instruct 148 youngsters in military music”
so they inspire “love in our national symbols.”37
The military also hosted a 1-month long interactive
museum, known as “El Trompo Mágico” or “Magic
Tub” in three major cities. The exhibition drew large
crowds in Mexico City (283,956), Monterrey (425,621),
and Puebla (330,428).38 Rafael Moreno Valle Rosas,
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Puebla’s state governor, said: “When the Mexican
Army and the Mexican people are together and put
aside ideological and political differences in favor of
the interests of the Patria, no enemy can triumph.”39
General Raymundo Balboa Aguirre co-chairs an
organization called Unidad de Vinculación con la
Ciudadania (UNIVIC) or Citizens Relations Unit. Officially, this body, which includes former Social Alternative Democratic Party Deputy Marina Arvizu Rivas
(an acquaintance of General Galván), seeks to bolster
collaboration between the Army and civilians, promote respect for human rights, and resolve conflicts
arising from the drug war. In fact, it sprang to life to
dampen criticism of the military after a fragmentation
grenade killed two youngsters, aged 5 and 9, aboard
a pick-up truck in a confrontation between the Army
and cartel members on the Guerrero-Ciudad Mier
highway in Tamaulipas on April 3, 2010. A human
rights activist claimed that soldiers reconfigured the
scene in an effort to absolve themselves of responsibility for the deaths.40 Incidents such as this may explain
why no folk ballads—the so-call corridos that often
extol the merits of traffickers—have circulated that
laud the armed forces. In all fairness, UNIVIC has
made reparations to victims, paid for funeral expenses, covered medical expenses, and funded psychological therapy.41
INCREASING ROLE OF WOMEN IN MEXICO’S
ARMED FORCES
This ceremony also provides an opportunity for
the military to showcase the ever-greater visibility of
women in uniform. Only in 1938 did the Army admit
women and then just to the Military Nursing School—

43

followed by the Military Medical School (1973) and
the Military Odontology School (1976). For years, assignments were limited to the medical arts, secretaries,
translators, drivers, communications specialists, and
other support personnel. Females gained admission
to the Colegio Heroico Militar, Mexico’s version of West
Point, for the first time in 2007 when, of 537 general
officers, only five were women.42 As seen in Figure 9,
the Defense Ministry claims that opportunities have
increased substantially.
Number of Women
in the Army

Year

Total Number in
Army

Percent Females

2006

6,309

196,767

3.21

2007

6,831

196,710

3.47

2008

7,980

202,355

3.94

2009

8,714

206,013

4.23

2010

10,234

206,013

4.97

2011

10,301

206,013

5.00

2012

11,810

211,000

5.60

Source: “Pide diputada una mujer al frente del Ejército mexicano” (“Deputy Asks for a Woman to Head the Mexican Army”),
El Universal, December 16, 2008; Secretaría de Defensa Nacional,
Fourth Annual Report, 2010; “Exaltan labor de mujeres militares”
(“Work of Female Military Personnel Praised”), Reforma, March 6,
2012; and “Impulsan sin plazas a mujeres militares” (“Few Posts
Open for Women”), Reforma, April 23, 2012.

Figure 9. Women in the Mexican Army
in Recent Years.
Under SEDENA’s “Equal Opportunities Program
for Women and Men, 2008-2012,” distaff members
may enroll in all of the army’s 17 schools, including
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those for combat instruction, basic and advanced
military police training, preparation of sergeants, and
the formation of officers for the Heroic War College.
The Defense Ministry has also organized conferences,
seminars, and courses to raise the consciousness of
troop with respect to gender equality.
On December 16, 2011, the military launched a
magazine titled Observatorio para la Igualidad entre Mujeres y Hombres en el Ejército y Fuerza Aérea Mexicanos
to highlight the steps taken to advance the careers of
female members of the armed forces and to eradicate
violence and discrimination against them.43 Greater
chances for women in the machista Army spring from
social and international pressure, the presence of more
skilled women prepared to enter the armed forces,
and the need to recruit more elements in an institution
plagued by desertions. Leftist Deputy Maricela Contreras Julián even looked to the not-too-distant future
when a woman could become secretary of defense—a
will-o’-the-wisp for decades to come.44
Female recruits and officers still face discrimination. While recognizing the advances accomplished by
them, Colonel Clementina Espíndola Zetna, who entered the military medical school in 1973, stated: “The
atmosphere was extremely difficult . . . [and] hostile.
In the beginning, we were soundly rejected: ‘women
[should] remain in the home and wash dishes’ . . . ‘you
belong in the kitchen,’ but as time went by integration
[of women into the military] progressed.”45
The Army has had a difficult time placing women,
and only six females, five of whom have retired, number among the institution's 541 generals. The National
Defense Ministry attributes the slow mobility to the
military’s lack of expansion. Spokesman General Ricardo Trevilla Trejo emphasized that distaff soldiers
and officers must wait until men leave the service to
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obtain assignments and promotions. As a result, it took
8 months to incorporate 1,852 trained women into the
ranks, and the objective, announced in 2007, of doubling
the number of females in uniform by the end of 2012
remains illusory.46
Few reports have surfaced about sexual harassment, a headache for the U.S. Armed Forces. The
small number of women in combat and fear of turning
in abusers may explain the situation. Human rights
organizations regularly report that Mexican soldiers
humiliate, strip, grope, and have sexual relations with
vulnerable females, especially migrants and indigenous girls. The Foreign Relations Ministry asserts
that there a few such transgressions. In late July 2012,
50 military personnel, including a captain, sergeants,
and corporals, participated in a group marriage ceremony in the southern states of Chiapas and Tabasco.
Volunteer coordinator Yolanda Martínez explained
that the mass wedding would ensure that the brides
would enjoy the benefits to which military families
were entitled.47
In a somewhat related subject, the status of gays in
uniform is in limbo. Homosexuality is not considered
a crime, and the Army follows a “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” policy. In the past, openly gay soldiers and officers faced dismissal and, no doubt, taunts and worse
from macho comrades.48
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIAN
COURTS
NGOs have long complained that trials of Army
and Navy personnel in military tribunals are secret,
the punishment lenient, and the results often unknown. Article 13 of the Mexican Constitution specifically provides for military jurisdiction over all
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military crimes and indiscipline; military tribunals
execute jurisdiction over military personnel in accord
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
At the same time, Article 129 stipulates that “in peace
time military authority can discharge only functions
that are directly connected to military discipline.” In
July 2011, Mexico’s Supreme National Court of Justice
(SCJN) ruled that such members of the armed services accused of torture, extrajudicial killing, and other
abuses should be tried in civilian courts. “This is a
very significant advance,” said Andrés Díaz, a lawyer
for the Migue Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center in Mexico City. “It creates very clear principles for
Mexican judges.”49
Enacting a law or rendering a judicial finding does
not ensure resolution of the problem at hand. A cause
celébré involved Lieutenant Colonel Alfredo Bravo
Alcaraz, who on March 19, 2009, opened fire with a
sub machine gun on a vehicle carrying two civilians,
one of whom died. When the survivor tried to escape,
the colonel asked why a lieutenant had failed to shoot
him, saying, "Fucking mothers! Why are you bringing him in alive? Take him over there and kill him,”
which the subordinate did.50 The SCNJ’s ruling aside,
Bravo Alcaraz remains incarcerated in a military prison under an arraigo or detention order. With respect
to the case, SEDENA issued the following statement: 51
The Defense Ministry assures society in general that it
will in no form tolerate actions contrary to the military
laws and regulations, and when one of its members
fails to conform to the Law, his behavior will be investigated . . . and he will be punished according to
the strict application of the law without regard to his
rank, assignment, or commission without impunity
nor opaqueness.
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At the early February 2012 “Loyalty March,” a
military ceremony, General Galván admitted that the
armed forces had made mistakes during the drug war
even as he praised the chief executive as “an intelligent, brave, honest commander who has identified
himself with the troops.” At the same time, defense
minister urged clarification of the legal framework in
which troops battled organized crime. Article 129 of
the 1917 Constitution, which specifies that: No military authority may, in time of peace, perform any functions
other than those that are directly connected with military
affairs,” has cast doubt on the legality of the military’s
involvement in fighting criminal organizations. No
doubt Galván and other top brass are concerned lest
their critics seek legal action to embarrass them now
that the Calderón administration has left office.
In late November 2011, Netzai Sandoval, a Mexican human rights lawyer, filed a complaint with the
International Criminal Court in The Hague, urging an
investigation of the deaths of hundreds of civilians at
the hands of the military and drug traffickers. The
petition, signed by 23,000 Mexican civilians, named
Calderón, Sinaloa Cartel boss Guzmán Loera, Public
Security Minister, Genaro García Luna, and the commanders of the Army and Navy.52 Activists’ pleas
aside, legislators from the PRI have blocked reform
of the Code of Military Justice that would transfer
jurisdiction over alleged crimes against civilians by
members of the armed forces to civil courts. In late
April 2012, the chairman of the Justice Committee in
the Senate claimed that SEDENA does not want the
change, and that his incredibly influential PRI colleague, Manlio Fabio Beltrones, posed the most formidable obstacle to change.53
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In response to freedom-of-information petitions,
SEDENA has begun to shed light on judicial actions.
In February 2012, it reported that 344 members of
the Army were behind bars, while others were either
standing trial or under arrest. This figure, which did
not include deserters, embraced five generals, two
colonels, six lieutenant colonels, and five majors. General Manuel de Jesús Moreno Aviña was convicted
after subordinates testified that he had ordered the
execution of civilians, their torture, and clandestine
burials. He committed these crimes, along with collaboration with narco-traffickers, when commanding
the military garrison in Ojinaga, Chihuahua, between
April 2008 and August 2009.54 Thirty-one other members of the Army were convicted because of links to
organized crime, and 19 of these were tried in response to recommendations from the CNDH. Several generals joined their ranks. In mid-March 2011,
military authorities arrested Pedro “El Guacho” Toga
Lara in Saltillo, where he reportedly served as Los
Zetas’ number two in the city. He and 16 colleagues
were incarcerated when their names were found on
the payroll or “narcolista” of Los Zetas. In addition
to the chief of the General Staff for the military zone,
those taken into custody included Sargent Evencio “El
Batman” Castillo, a former member of the Special Airborne Forces Group (GAFES), from which the original
Zetas deserted. Reportedly, El Batman recruited for
Los Zetas who, in return for information about troop
movements, received 3,000 pesos or more every two
weeks at an OXXO convenience store, a 7-Eleven, or
a WalMart. The prisoners alleged that they confessed
only after being tortured.55 Figure 10 portrays notable
cases of military personnel arrested, charged, or convicted of crimes.
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Individual
General Ricardo Escorcia
Vargas (commander of
24th Military Zone in
Morelos) and Lt. Col.
Silvio Hernández Soto.
Retired Div. Generals
Ricardo Escorcia Vargas
and Tomas Ángeles Dauahare (formerly Number
Two in SEDENA); Brig.
General Roberto Dawe
González; commanded an
elite unit assigned to the
20th Military Zone headquartered in Colima.*

Date
Arrested

Crime/Alleged Crime

May 18,
2012

May 15,
2012

Trial Court

Current Status

Provided information to
the Beltrán Leyva Organization (BLO) in late 2007
when they were allies of
the Sinaloa Cartel.

Military (Yet to stand
trial)

Incarcerated in
Almoloya highsecurity prison
in Mexico State
on July 31,
2012.

Provided information to
the BLO in late 2007 when
they were allies of the
Sinaloa Cartel.

Military (Yet to stand
trial); Ángeles Dauahare has produced
documents indicating
he was in Germany at
the time of the alleged
crime.

Incarcerated in
Almoloya highsecurity prison
in Mexico State
on July 31,
2012.

Gen. Manuel de Jesús
Moreno Aviña; excommander of garrison
in Ojinaga, CHIH on the
Texas border.

Jan. 30,
2012

Collaboration with narcotraffickers in torture,
execution,
and clandestine
burials of civilians.

Military

Pending

Brig. Gen. Rubén Pérez
Ramírez

N.D.

Aiding narco-traffickers

Military

Imprisoned

Maj. Iván Reyna Muñoz
(represented Mexico in
Panamerican Games in
1991 and 1993.)

Nov.
2011

Extortion; accused by
Édgar “La Barbie” Valdez
Villarreal of cooperating
with the BLO.

Military

A captain, four lieutenants, and two sergeants.

MidOct.,
2011

The Army accused them
of warning the BLO of
pending military operations against the cartel in
Morelos.

Military

Confessed and
were confined
in the federal
prison in Villa
Aldama, VC.

2011

Altering the scene where
soldiers, working with
Nuevo León police, killed
an innocent young man,
Jorge Otilio Cantú on
April 18.

Civilian court placed
him under the jurisdiction of a military
tribunal.

Seeking amparo
from Mexico’s
Supreme Court
(SCJN).

March
17, 2011

The only GAFES soldier
captured in connection
with safeguarding Los
Zetas in COAH; he allegedly received 3,000 pesos
($240) every 2 weeks for
reporting troop
movements.

Military

Imprisoned

Carlos Fidel Ábrego

Sgt. Evencio “El Batman”
Castillo; ex-member of
GAFES special forces.

Figure 10. Examples of Military Personnel Accused, Arrested,
Charged, or Convicted of Crimes.
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Date
Arrested

Crime/Alleged Crime

March
12, 2011

Recruited 21 military
personnel, including a
general in the 6th Military
Zone in Saltillo, COAH, to
protect Los Zetas in return
for generous bribes.

Military

Imprisoned

Retired military officers
Francisco Ortega Zamora
and Juan Carlos Cruz
Espinoza who served,
respectively, as police
chief and assistant police
chief in Tijuana, BC.

Feb.
2010

Allegedly protected notorious killers and traffickers
José Manuel “El Teo”
García Simental and
Raydel “El Muletas”/“The
Crutches” López Uriate.

N.A. (Retired officers
still come under the
jurisdiction of military
tribunals).

N.A.

Major Elfego José Luján
Ruiz; commander 35th
Infantry Battalion in
Nuevo Casas Grandes,
CHIH.

March
2010

Eye Witnesses claimed
that he ordered two
deserters smothered and
their bodies burned.

Military; seeking an
amparo or injunction
from SCJN.

Imprisoned in
military penitentiary in DF.

Imprisoned in
military penitentiary in DF.

Individual

Pedro “El Gaucho” Toga
Lara

Trial Court

Current Status

Lt. Col. Alfredo Bravo
Alcaraz: subcommander
of 35th Infantry Battalion
in Nuevo Casas Grandes,
CHIH.

March
10, 2010

Committed atrocities
against civilians.

Military; seeking an
amparo from SCJN on
the grounds that he
was following orders;
case under consideration.

Sgt. José Félix Flores
Camacho

2007

Killing three people while
driving a military vehicle
in EDOMEX.

Seeking an amparo
from SCJN.

Pending

Silvia Hernández Tamari
(military nurse)

N.D.

Sexual abuse of a minor.

Military (after a PGR
investigation).

No information

Figure 10. Examples of Military Personnel Accused,
Arrested, Charged, or Convicted of Crimes cont.
Note: *Major Iván Reyna Muñoz, subordinate of Escorcia Vargas,
was convicted for the same crime and imprisoned in Querétaro;
Defense Secretary Galván, who was unaware of the investigation
into Dawe’s activities, had planned to promote the general.
Sources: Gustavo Castillo García, “Militares acusados de ejecutar
a 7 en Chihuahua buscan apoyo de SCJN” (“Officers Accused
of Executing 7 in Chihuahua Seek Support of SCJN”), La Jornada,
May 20, 2012; Benito Jiménez, “Suman 290 militares presos por
abusos” (“Total of 290 Military Prisoners Charged with Abuses”),
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Reforma, May 12, 2012; Benito Jiménez, “Tienen en prisión a cinco
Generales” (“Five Generals are in Prison”), Reforma, February 19,
2012; “Pagaba a General narco en Coahuila” (“Narco-traffickers
Paid a General in Coahuila”), Reforma, February 18, 2012; “Ordenó
quemar a dos desertores” (“Two Deserters Ordered Burned”), El
Heraldo de Chihuahua, February 15, 2012; Randal C. Archibold,
“Mexican General Is Charged in Killings and Abuses,” New York
Times, February 1, 2012; Abel Barajas, “Planeaba Sedena ascender
a Dawe” (“Defense Ministry Planned to Promote Dawe”), Reforma, July 28, 2012; and Víctor Fuentes, “Prevé Corte acotar el fuero
militar” (“Court Indicates That It Will Set Boundaries for Military
Tribunals,” Reforma, July 28, 2012); and Benito Jiménez, “Transladan a Generals a penal” (“Generals Transferred to Prison”), Reforma, July 31, 2012.

Figure 10. Examples of Military Personnel
Accused, Arrested, Charged, or Convicted of
Crimes, cont.
While moving slowly to put its house in order, the
Army still encompasses senior brass who have at least
one foot, if not two, planted in the past. This was evident when SEDENA held a ceremony in the Distrito
Federal’s Military Camp No. 1 to pay homage to General Mario Acosta Chaparro, who died at the hands
of an assassin in Mexico City on April 20, 2012. During 45 years in the military, the deceased retiree had
commanded parachutists, infantry battalions, the 27th
Military Zone in Guerrero, and the Judicial Military
Police. Still, his career was tainted by persistent accusations that he had protected the enormously powerful drug-trafficker Amado “Lord of the Skies” Carrillo
Fuentes. He was also linked to the disappearance in
Guerrero of 143 alleged subversives during the “dirty
war” of the 1970s. A colonel who had served under
Acosta spoke at his memorial service and stated that:
“I wish that many generals were like him.”56
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Apart from brutal killings and collaboration with
the enemy, the Army has been cited for the mismanagement of funds. The Superior Auditor of the Federation (ASF), Mexico’s version of the U.S. General
Accounting Office, has charged a SEDENA agency
that handles $64 million with letting large no-bid contracts. In addition, the Defense Ministry paid Russia
approximately $1 million to void an order to repair
five helicopters. A Ukrainian firm received $1.6 million to transport the aircraft, but cancelled the agreement without paying a penalty. In 2009 the Army
purchased 54 Humvees, which had been used only
two times as of July 2010.57
Invoking national security, the Defense Ministry
rejected a request from the Mexican Academy of Science to test the GT200, a molecular detector purchased
from the United Kingdom’s Global Technical LTD.
The Army (738) and other security agencies have purchased 940 of these devices, known as the “Devil’s
Ouija” at a cost of $28 million for use in anti-narcotics
operations. Physicist Dr. Luis Mochán Backal asserted that proponents were only describing the GT200’s
positive qualities, while omitting its “failures.”58
(See Figure 11.)
To strengthen the esprit de corps and discourage
desertions, SEDENA has initiated 21-gun salutes at
burials, made certain a military band was on hand
to honor the fallen, provided a memorial flag to the
wife, authorized a life pension for widows, and furnished broader insurance coverage. Furthermore, it
has erected a monument to soldiers who died while
serving their country.61
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Year

Budget
(Millions of Pesos)

Increased Pay for
Combat Troops

1997

28.456

11,122

1998

27,435

18,861

1999

30,311

19,849

No. of Desertions

2000

20,375

22,205

2001

22,424

15,870

2002

22,705

15,503

2003

22,831

14,744

2004

23,332

18,267

2005

25,002

20,224

2006

26,031

4,000 pesos

16,405

2007

32,200

26.9%

16,641

2008

34,861

41.2%

8,280

2009

43,632

68.6%

6,879

2010

43,632

92.2%

4,398

2011

50,039

118.5%
(8,000 pesos)

1,394
(Through May 31)

2012

55,610

N.A.

N.A.

Figure 11. Military Budgets and Desertions.
Notes:
* Juan Arvizu and Andrea Merlos, “Este año van 18 mil:
diputados,” El Universal, December 4, 2008.
** Jorge Alejandro Medellín, “A la baja, reclutamiento para
Ejército mexicano,” El Universal, February 8, 2009.
*** Desertions between December 1, 2000 and August 31,
2008: the number between January 2007 and June 2011 was 40,179,
according to “Con mejor salario baja deserción en fuerzas armadas,” Milenio.com, September 11, 2011; of this number, 17,758
were soldiers, 119 officers,59 and eight “jefes” (ranking officers);
see “Más de 100 mil soldados han desertado en siete años, dice el
Ejército” (“The Army Says that More than 100 Thousand Soldiers
have Deserted in Seven Years”), Diario Las Americas.com, January 23, 2008, available from www.diariolasamericas.com/news; and
January 1 through November 27, 2008; Benito Jiménez, “Refuerza
Ejército plan de reclutamiento” (“Army Reinforces Recruitment
Plans”), Reforma, February 7, 2008.
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**** Between 1995 and September 2008, 1,559 GAFES deserted; between March 2009 and March 2011, some 121 Special Forces
went absent without leave (AWOL) between January 2007 and
November 30, 2011, 92.43 percent of the 69,315 deserters were
common soldiers, many of whom had no idea of the rigors of
military life.60
Sources: www.sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2007/marzo_2007.pdf; www.
sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2011/febrero-2011.pdf;
www.infomexorg.mx/
gobiernofederal/moduloPublico/rMedioElectP.action?idFolioSol
=0000700017811&idTipoResp=6#; www.sedena.gob.mx/pdf/ifai/2011/
junio-2011.pdf; “Recompensan a militares” (“Compensation of
Military Men”), Reforma, February 19, 2012.

Figure 11. Military Budgets and Desertions, cont.
To compensate for desertions, the Army has also
reached out to young peasants, who have been devastated by their country’s sluggish economic growth
amid a recession in the United States. Although training may be rigorous and assignments challenging,
campesinos from extremely poor states like Oaxaca,
Guerrero, and Chiapas experience a better quality of
life in the military. “There is recruitment throughout
the Republic, principally in marginal and economically vulnerable areas to take advantage of the human
resources necessary for integrating the [recruits] into
the Army as soldiers,” said Brigadier General Sergio
García Vera, subdirector general of personnel at SEDENA. He reported recruiting 80,808 elements during
the first 4 ½ years of Calderón’s administration.62 (See
Figure 12.)
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Year

Total Personnel

Number of Members
of the Army*

Number of Members
of the Navy

1980

102,975

102,975

N.A.

1985

158,661

124,497

34,164

1990

192,994

151,178

41,816

1991

198,955

155,218

43,737

1992

203,829

157,147

46,687

1993

210,241

162,169

48,072

1994

216,943

168,773

48,170

1995

225,080

171,952

53,128

1996

232,166

179,038

53,128

1997

236,575

182,328

54,247

1998

235,894

182,328

53,566

1999

237,301

182,329

54,972

2000

237,552

182,329

55,223

2001

234,308

185,143

49.165

2002

238,169

188,143

50,026

2003

238,447

191,143

47,304

2004

236,459

191,143

47,316

2005

238,787

191,143

47,644

2006

244,238

196,767

47,471

2007

246,742

196,710

50,032

2008

254,035

202,355

51,680

2009

258,992

206,013

52,979

2010

259,237

206,013

53,224

2011

259,237**

206,013

53,224

2012

259,630**

206,013

53,617

Figure 12: Composition of Mexico’s Armed Forces.
*A partial breakdown of personnel is 115,095 soldiers (regular soldiers); 8,506 corporals, 757 second sergeants, 283 first sergeants, 661 second lieutenants, 462 first lieutenants, 52 second
captains, 40 first captains, 32 majors, and 10 lieutenant colonels.
** Tentative Figures.
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Sources: Secretaría
and Presidencia de
sos Humanos and
Fuerzas Armadas”
Human Resources
Armed Forces).

de Defensa Nacional; Secretaría de Marina;
la República, Quinto Informe, Anexo: “RecurProfesionalización de los Miembros de Las
(Fifth State of the Nation Address, Annex:
and Professionalization of Members of the

Figure 12: Composition of Mexico’s Armed
Forces, cont.
SEDENA has not followed César Duarte Jáquez’
recommendation that it draft so-called “Ni-Nis”—
the roughly 7.5 million young Mexicans who neither
work nor study, but live aimless, sometimes violent,
lives. In making this proposal, Chihuahua’s governor
asserted that these youngsters were “easy marks to be
recruited by organized crime. . . .” Former Secretary
of Education Alonso Lujambio quickly rejected the
idea, stating that there were only 285,000 such young
people and stressing the importance that these individuals pursue educational opportunities.63
Security firms in Mexico are doing a brisk business. In recruiting body guards, skilled drivers, technical experts, and consultants, they often look to former members of the military not only because of their
training and discipline but also their legal right to carry firearms. Ricardo de León Dorantes, president of
the National Council of Public Security (CNSP), which
embraces 200 firms, estimated that 40 percent of body
guards hired by private parties are former members of
the armed forces, while half are ex-policemen. In late
2008 their salaries ranged from 12,000 pesos ($1,200)
to 20,000 pesos ($1,667) per month. In 2010, outlays on
private security increased 11 percent over the previous year nationwide—with a 33 percent rise in states
along the U.S.-Mexican border.64 Although security
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providers are supposed to register with authorities,
hundreds of such corporations ignore this requirement, which gives them greater flexibility to hire cashiered cops and soldiers.
On a day-to-day basis, average citizens often hand
over modest sums to informal attendants. These
franeleros, who often use sidewalks as parking places,
keep an eye on their vehicles while they are running
errands, shopping, or dining.
MANUFACTURING
The Army has expanded its manufacturing of
munitions, uniforms, shoes, and other items. In August 2010, a SEDENA spokesman indicated that the
military was 90 percent self-sufficient in the output of
much of its equipment. In addition, the SEDENA Military Factories in Mexico City produce, under license,
the Heckler and Koch family of small arms and light
weapons. They have begun turning out the FX-05
Xiuhcóatl assault rifle, as well as moving away from
the 7.62 mm G-3 to smaller and more effective caliber
weapons. The factories are also assembling the Oshkosh SandCat protected patrol vehicle, a 4x4 armored
truck renowned for its speed and maneuverability.65
If it is not already doing so, SEDENA will produce
its own version of a homemade armored tank, nicknamed El Montruo 2011, employed by Los Zetas for
urban warfare. The steel-plated “Monster,” also referred to as the “Batimóvil,” operates at up to 68 miles
per hour, carries a dozen shooters, and provides small
openings through which they can fire high-powered
weapons. “El Monstruo 2011 is a homemade armored
tank, the latest weapons innovation from Los Zetas,
one of Mexico’s largest and most brutal drug trafficking organizations.”66
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In mid-2012 El Universal reported that the ministry
signed a contract for $5,000 million pesos ($379 million) to purchase state-of-the-art communication interception equipment from Security Tracking Devices,
a Jalisco-based firm. The agreement raised questions
because of its secrecy, the potential for the Army to
eavesdrop on innocent civilians, and the inability of
journalists to find the contractor’s alleged office in
Mexico City.67
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
Although Mexico’s generals have obeyed rather
than deliberated, the absence of coups d’état does not
mean that the Army is indifferent to political decisions. Traditionally, they have expressed their views
to the president or secretary of interior behind closed
doors. Such sub rosa contacts ended during the Fox
administration (2000-06) when Defense Secretary de
la Vega formally presented the activities of SEDENA
to a congressional committee. Rather than visit Congress, General Galván has invited legislators to meet
with him on military installations.
Key officers have spoken out on political matters.
General Sergio Aponte Polito, commander of the Second Military Region in northwest Mexico, publically
excoriated the ubiquitous involvement of elected and
appointed officials in drug trafficking in the Tijuana
area. He claimed that the police were cooperating
with migrant smugglers, bank robbers, and drug lords.
“The jowly, silver-haired 64-year-old general speaks
in severe tones and writes as if he’s inscribing his epitaph,” observed a seasoned journalist. “What he’s doing is completely unprecedented,” stated Roderic Ai
Camp, an expert on the Mexican military at Claremont
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McKenna College.68 Aponte Polito’s persistent criticism upset the National Action Party administration
in Baja California and led to his being transferred to
Mexico City.
Three years later, another commander of the Second Military Region was less reticent to condemn unprofessional behavior. After the September 16, 2011,
Independence Day celebration, General Alfonso Duarte Múgica publically upbraided Government Secretary Cuauhtémoc Cardona Benavides. At a gathering
organized by the military, Duarte said “I do not want
to see [Cardona] in any military installation, he is an
ugly and disrespectful drunk.” Both Governor Osuna
Millán and a television camera crew observed this
contretemps.69
President Fox’s defense secretary, General Gerardo Clemente R. Vega García (2000-2006), followed
the practice of civilian cabinet members by appearing
before a congressional committee to discuss his ministry’s interests, goals, and performance. In contrast,
General Galván shuns the public sessions for private
meetings with legislators from various parties in his
headquarters. He has not shied away from upbraiding politicians on their performance. “I understand
that political power is complex and involves various
forms, objectives, and interests. Nevertheless, at all
times and under all circumstances [elected officials]
the national well-being must take precedence,” he
said after the 2010 Loyalty March celebration.70
PENITENTIARIES
The government euphemistically calls a number of its prisons “Centers of Social Readaptation”
(CERESOs). Wardens, their subordinates, and guards
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nominally control Mexico’s penitentiaries, especially
the nine high-security federal facilities. In reality,
pay-offs by inmates to their keepers, combined with
the proliferation of organized gangs behind bars, give
well-heeled convicts unparalleled influence. Wealthy
“deluxe prisoners” grease the palms of guards, who—
for the right price—will permit them to exit the facility
for a few hours to conduct business, love-making, or
criminal ventures. They will use every tactic to include
fear, intimidation, money, sex, etc., to compromise the
prison staff and the administration.71
Inmates sometimes settle scores with adversaries behind bars—most notoriously exemplified in
the 2004 murders of El Chapo’s brother, Arturo “El
Pollo”/”The Chicken” Guzmán Loera (December 31)
and his associate Miguel Ángel “Ceja Güera”/White
Eyebrow” Beltrán Lugo (October 6) inside La Palma
prison. At the same time, drug lords carry on negotiations behind bars. The late Assistant Attorney General José Luis Santiago Vasconcelos acknowledged that
Los Zetas’ patron, Osiel, cut a deal to cooperate with
Tijuana Cartel honcho, Benjamín Arellano Félix, to
decimate the Sinaloa Cartel while both were “locked
up” in La Palma prison near Mexico City.72
In January 2005 gangsters seized six employees of
the Matamoros penitentiary and handcuffed, blindfolded, and shot them, leaving their cadavers in a
white sport utility vehicle parked opposite the facility.
This savagery may have been a response to the siege
6 days earlier of La Palma prison by 750 Federal Police and military. Clearly, drug dealers had corrupted
the guards and were overseeing violent networks
from inside. In early December 2008 enemies are believed to have executed two Zetas in the Mazatlán
detention center.73
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Thanks to widespread access to cell phones, prisoners find it easy to engage in extortion. A committee
of the Chamber of Deputies estimated that convicts
had extorted 186,620 million pesos from 2001 to 2007.
The equipment installed in 2007 to block telephone
signals in 11 prisons fell into disrepair and no longer
functions.74 This situation prompted Mexico State to
invest 10 million pesos (roughly $770,000) to block
telephone signals in its four largest penitentiaries, Neza-Bordo (Nezahualcóyotl), Barrientos (Tlalnepantla),
Chiconaultla (Ecatepec), and Almoloya de Juárez
(Santiaguito).75
Just as in the United States, drugs flow freely inside Mexico’s prison walls. Of the 37,000 inmates in
Mexico City’s penal institutions, an estimated 25,900
are addicts. Authorities admit that the availability of
the substances, which may generate 15.5 million pesos a month, represents a convenient way to minimize
melees and curb other violent outbursts. As a prison
official told a city councilman: “Sir, if I cut off the flow
of drugs, there will be a mutiny the next day.”76 In late
2008, authorities discovered 51 packets containing 119
kilograms of marijuana covered with sacks of toilet
paper and boxes of soft drinks aboard a truck seeking to enter the capital’s Reclusorio Sur.77 So ubiquitous were drugs in the Detention Center (CEDES) of
Reynosa that it gained fame as a “narcopenal,” which
was run by the convicts. “La Suburban,” a gang linked
to Los Zetas, not only handled the intramural drug
trade, but extorted money from their foes who lived
in an adjoining structure known as “the Sinai” in the
two-building compound.78
Overcrowding accentuates turmoil. Of Mexico’s
439 federal, state, and local penal institutions, 228 are
stuffed with an excessive number of inmates. In Mex-
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ico City’s Reclusorio Oriente, 70 prisoners occupy one
six-by-five square meter cell. They must sleep standing up, lie in hallways, vie for green spaces to stretch
out, or pay for access to a bunk.79 Exacerbating the
crisis is that 80 percent of federal prisoners (34,952)
are in state prisons—with the remainder (9,494) in
federal institutions. In 2010 Mexico had 222,771 men
and women behind bars, according to the Ministry of
Public Safety.80
In Zacatecas on May 16, 2009, an especially brazen
escape occurred, and all of it is available for public
viewing on YouTube. Before dawn, 30 or more heavily armed thugs believed to be Zetas, riding in trucks
adorned with AFI logos, stormed into the Cieneguillas penitentiary as one of their helicopters whirred
overhead. In the blitzkrieg assault, they extricated
53 prisoners, including Zetas, members of the Beltrán
Leyva crime family, and other narco-felons. State and
federal authorities immediately began apprehending
escapees even as they investigated the director and
his 50 subordinates to determine who fostered the escape.81 One of several recaptured was Osvaldo “The
Vampire” García Delgado, a kidnapping specialist
whose Los Cotorros gang coordinates activities with
Los Zetas in the state of Hidalgo.
When incarcerated, Los Zetas threaten to beat
other convicts if they do not fork over 5,000 pesos or
more. In addition, the paramilitaries provide women,
drugs, and food to these inmates who are forced to
pay off debts incurred behind bars by working for Los
Zetas even after they have completed their sentences.
“There are few cases when men exit prisons clean,”
explained one expert. “I can assure you that practically no one under 30 does so.”82
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In October 2009, actions of Los Zetas precipitated
a riot in the Topo Chico prison in Nuevo León that
the state police had to put down. Some 100 Zetas virtually controlled the 400 other inmates in the facility
through extortion and shake downs for protection. Before the uprising, PRI Governor Natividad González
Parás had brushed off friction in the penitentiary as:
“A squabble between one group of friends against
another group of friends over personal problems.”83
As in other facilities, Los Zetas practice virtual “selfgovernance” in the federal prison in Apodaca, Nuevo
León (Cereso), where they attack members of the Gulf
Cartel and other foes.84
Such conditions have prompted the government
to dispatch Army units to conduct searches in penitentiaries and sometimes take control of the institutions. Examples abound: in early June 2009, elements
of the Army and Federal Police riding in small tanks,
armored vehicles, and troop transports swept into
Xalapa’s Ignacio Allende prison, one of the oldest detention centers in Veracruz. The authorities did not
disclose how many of the serious felons were moved
to other facilities.
In mid-August 2009, General Felipe de Jesús Espitia, commander of the Fifth Military Zone, announced
that troops would replace civilian administrators and
guards at Cereso of Aquiles Serdán, located in the heart
of Chihuahua state. This action followed the resignation of the warden after three of his bodyguards were
killed. During the night of August 29, 2010, units of
the 24th Military Zone took charge of Morelos’ Atlacholoaya Cereso after a series of violent incidents that
took the life of the facility’s director. Soldiers also assumed control of district jails in Cuautla, Jojutla, Jonacatepec, Telecala, and Pueten de Istia.85
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Military men now serve as directors of the penal
facilities in the three largest cities in Quintana Roo. In
late April 2011, General Carlos Bibiano Villa Castillo,
the state’s secretary of public security, placed officers
in charge of the Cereso in Chetumal (Captain José de
Jesús Moreno Abad), the Cereso in Cancún (General
Eulalio Rodríguez Valdivia), and the jails in Playa del
Carmen (Second Captain José Luis y Peniche Novelo)
and Cancún (Captain Higinio Sánchez Baltazar). The
state director of prisons is a civilian attorney, Ricardo
Tejada de Luna.86
Army personnel now control access to the principal entrances to three Monterrey area penitentiaries—
Topo Chico, Cadereyta and Apodaca—inside of which
more than 50 killings have taken place.87 Military police have also taken over security duties for the PGR’s
Center of Federal Investigations in Mexico City where
some 250 suspects were being held in mid-2012.88
In a volt-face, Defense Secretary Galván ordered
52 soldiers held prisoner at the Campo Militar 1-J be
transferred to a federal penitentiary in Villa Aldama,
Veracruz, in April 2011. He feared that their underground allies might attempt to free the inmates from
the SEDENA prison in Mexico City.89
CUSTOMS
In recent years, presidents have sought to fight
corruption among customs agents—a Herculean challenge that they have lost because of the lucrative payments to officials who either close their eyes to smuggling or take part in the crime. In mid-August 2009,
the armed forces took over the functions of the fiscal
police in 49 land ports across the northern border.
For its part, the Navy has begun overseeing customs
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operations in seaports. Two years earlier, the Army
assumed the inspection of passengers at the Rodolfo
Sánchez Taboada airport in Mexicali because of suspicion that seven Federal Preventative Police agents
were facilitating cocaine shipments to the United
States.90
GUARDIANS OF ELECTIONS
The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), a citizen-run
body that registers voters, organizes the balloting,
and announces the preliminary results, formally requested that the Army guarantee the security of elections in 2012, as it has done in previous balloting.
Not only did the presidential showdown take place
on July 1, but all 500 federal deputies and 64 of 128
senators were chosen on that date. In addition, there
will also be gubernatorial and city council contests
in 14 states—with a local election in Coahuila set for
October 21.91 Leonardo Valdés Zurita, president of
the IFE, stated that conditions appeared favorable in
Mexico City, but that “a very complex situation” existed in Chihuahua, Guerrero Monterrey, Michoacán,
and Tamaulipas. The military has provided security
for past elections, but given the violence afflicting the
nation, it sent more troops into the streets last year,
especially in the vicinity of polling places.92 So narrow was Calderón’s 2006 victory that the Army still
guards cast ballots night and day, 7 days per week, in
the nation’s 300 voting districts. In Querétaro alone,
21 soldiers fulfill this assignment.93
The vulnerability of politicians to narco-assassins
became evident in the mid-2010 contest for governor
in Tamaulipas, a state highlighted by fighting between
Los Zetas and a group of syndicates supporting the
Gulf Cartel. In the run-up to the July 4 election for the
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statehouse, Los Zetas executed PRI candidate Rodolfo
Torre Cantú as he was traveling to the Ciudad Victoria airport on his final campaign swing. Although
any politician may be targeted, the syndicates are especially eager to influence the voting in municipalities
in which they store, process, and transport drugs.94
During Calderón’s administration, 28 serving mayors
have died at the hands of cartels. PRI Federal Deputy
Francisco Moreno Merino, whose constituency service office in Cuernavaca was fired upon and burned
in March 2010, has requested that the military protect
him and his family.95
FIREFIGHTERS
On August 25, 2011, a group of Los Zetas set fire
to the Casino Royale in Monterrey. The conflagration
took 53 lives. In the aftermath of the tragedy, SEDENA
announced the formation of a brigade of fire fighters.
Although the Army has long acted in accordance with
its DN-III strategy of disaster relief, these efforts have
typically focused on floods, volcanic eruptions, forest
fires, tropical storms, earthquakes, and other catastrophes. The tragedy in Monterrey produced a broader
view of this function, and involved activating an Immediate Response to Disasters and Emergencies Team
(ERIED), composed of seven officers and 45 enlisted
volunteers, which was formed in the aftermath of the
September 1985 earthquakes that struck Mexico City
and adjoining areas.96
SOCCER SOLDIERS
The Army and Federal Police were on hand to
ensure the safety of players, officials, and fans when
Torreón’s Santos Laguna (Lagoon Saints) and Mon67

terrey Rayados (Rays) competed in the Mexico’s Soccer Finals on May 2012. The tight security enabled
the Torreón team to win 2 to 1—with no the only
disturbances coming from disgruntled Monterrey
aficionados.97
CONCLUSIONS
Several observations flow from this analysis. First,
President Calderón gave the Mexican military an assignment for which it lacked proper training, preparation, and equipment. The more than 47,000 drug-related deaths during the previous chief executive’s tenure
are more an indictment of dirty, incompetent civilian
police agencies than of the armed forces, which have
managed to capture dozens of important traffickers.
The drug war and new tasks have expanded the Army’s budget, size, and stock of equipment. Regrettably, contact with the underworld has corrupted
numerous enlistees and officers, while using security
concerns to justify the purchase of a new presidential
airplane at twice the cost of Air Force One.
Second, as it amplifies current functions, the Army
(and, to a lesser extent, the Navy) will have greater
contact with civilians. While military personnel may
not socialize widely with men and women outside the
barracks, it is likely that their status as a caste marginal from the rest of society will diminish.
Third, Peña Nieto has unveiled a six-point security
initiative. The document is ripe with shibboleths about
“transparency,” “cooperation,” and “accountability.”
More important is his plan to shift the primary focus of
Mexico’s drug wars from that of hunting down cartels
and their capos to preventing and curbing murders,
kidnappings, and extortion. His Gobernación Secre-
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tary, Miguel Osorio Chong, argued that Calderón’s
“kingpin” approach failed miserably—with abductions soaring 83 percent, violent robberies 65 percent,
and extortion 40 percent during the past six years. To
improve anti-crime efforts, the new government has
announced the creation of a paramilitary “National
Gendarmerie (GN),” initially composed of 10,000 elements with the possibility of boosting the number
to 40,000 civilians and military. This force, which is
analogous to Chile’s Carabineri or Spain’s Guardia
Nacional, will be deployed in hotspots where violence
and instability are the greatest. The Ministry of Public
Security (SSP) will be folded into Gobernación, which
will spearhead the new version of the war on drugs. It
will oversee intelligence collection and add 15 units to
the Federal Police to concentrate solely on kidnapping
and extortion. The government will continue to upgrade the quality of law-enforcement personnel—61
percent earn just over $300 a month and nearly twothirds have only a elementary school education, according the British Broadcasting Corporation.
Such forces are anathema to shady politicians such
as governors and mayors who want to preserve their
grip on cops in their jurisdictions. Although the 10,000
elements mentioned initially for the National Gendarmerie appear formidable, the number of men and
women available at any given time shrinks when taking into consideration eight-hour shifts, illnesses, vacations, training exercises, and desertions. It remains
to be seen whether SEDENA will supply its best and
brightest to a force that it doesn’t control. Meanwhile,
Mexico’s leaders will have no alternative but to depend heavily on the armed forces in combating DTOs
for the next few months.
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Fourth, Peña Nieto seeks to return thousands of
soldiers to the barracks—a move that SEDENA is likely
to applaud in light of NGO criticism of human rights
abuses and corruption, as well as the prevalence of
mental illness among troops.98 At the same time, the
involvement of the Navy and the Support Forces of
the Federal Police could grow in light of their success
in fighting criminals. The future of the Federal Police
Support Forces, also known as GOPES is uncertain.
Under Calderón, this agency was headed by General
(Ret.) Rodolfo Cruz López within the SSP and did a commendable job providing “assistance to civil authorities
to combat organized crime and threats to the security of
the nation.”
Fifth, if the past is prologue to the future, strengthening Gobernación, creating the GN, and reconfiguring police functions will engender friction between
and among these agencies and the Defense Ministry.
Such tensions militate against amending the Constitution to place a single secretary over the Army and
the Navy. Nor is it likely that the Army and Navy
will configure a joint general staff. At the same time,
the military will renew its effort in Congress to amend
the Code of Military Justice to unambiguously justify
the military’s profound involvement in combatting
cartels. The armed forces want protection from NGOs
who have accused senior officers of war crimes before the International Court of Justice and other
tribunals—as has already occurred with charges
against President Calderón.
Sixth, no matter which agency leads in fighting
narco-criminals, the next Mexican chief executive will
be under pressure to rely less on boots on the ground
and more on informants, wire-taps, drones, surveillance cameras, computer analysis of communications,
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more rigorous gathering and examination of intelligence, and monetary oversight. There is a creative
element to interservice rivalry, which finds the Army
improving its intelligence gathering, analytic capability, and professionalism.
Seventh, domestic and international groups will
force the armed forces to increase transparency and
proclaim their firm opposition to human rights abuses—to the point of possibly allowing civil courts to try
military personnel accused of certain crimes against
non-combatants.
Eighth, in the same vein, the Army and Navy will
continue to publicize the ever-more visible presence
of females in the armed services even as machismo remains alive. Little or no future growth in SEDENA’s
numbers means that distaff officers and enlistees must
still scramble for positions and promotions.
Ninth, the military will pursue its public relations
campaign to downplay the corruption arising from
interaction with cartels. The services will continue to
employ media advertisements, survey research, and
special events to ingratiate themselves with the public, which supports the men and women in uniform
despite highly publicized bribetaking, thefts, misallocation of funds, and human rights violations.
Tenth, the northward flood of Central American
emigrants and the southward thrust of Los Zetas and
the Sinaloa Cartel make it crucial for Mexico to accept
the difficult task, sometimes akin to herding cats, of
coordinating social and anti-crime policies with its
southern neighbors.
Eleventh, mutual security concerns will lead to
more numerous and closer contacts between the U.S.
military and security agencies and their Mexican
counterparts even as SEDENA and SEMAR reach out
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to Canada, Colombia, and other countries for training, specialized arms, intelligence, and instruction in
cyber-security.
Twelfth, Peña Nieto’s appointment of General
Oscar Naranjo as his security guru could signal that
DTOs that maintain a low profile, avoid eye-catching
sadistic acts, and refrain from attacking citizens might
become a low priority for pursuit and capture. Rather
than throwing large units at the enemy as Calderón
did, the Colombian four-star favors well-trained,
highly mobile, relatively small squads.99
The U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM),
headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado
and better known as NORTHCOM, can also be helpful
by furnishing language-training, information, radars,
night goggles, and other used surveillance equipment
to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) and
other organizations such as the Texas Department of
Public Security. Both agencies’ responsibilities have
mushroomed with the accelerated flow of drugs and
drug-merchants across the 2,000-mile binational frontier, and the southward cascade of weapons.
Operation NIMBUS, supervised by NORTHCOM,
epitomized an effective Joint Task Force initiative. In
mid-February 2012, active-duty soldiers from Fort
Hood and Fort Bliss deployed to southern New Mexico and Arizona to bolster CBP’s security efforts.100
In the past, National Guard units have successfully
bolstered protection of porous, vulnerable areas. Operation JUMP START, which involved a 2-year assignment of guardsmen to the Yuma Arizona sector, won
praise from then-governors Arnold Schwarzenegger (California), Bill Richardson (New Mexico), and
Janet Napolitano (Arizona), who wanted the
mission extended.101
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Finally, Washington can assist Mexico at the margins with intelligence, training, equipment, and vigilance of money flows. Ultimately, the key players
have to be our neighbor’s political, economic, and social establishment. As things stand now, many of the
privileged outside the country’s north live cocooned
from much of the violence thanks to sophisticated security systems, trained drivers, skilled bodyguards,
the ability to educate their youngsters abroad, and the
wherewithal to move their families to, and run their
enterprises from, Texas and other border states. As
indicated earlier, far too many governors either collaborate with cartels or close their eyes to crimes.
Mexico’s nomenklatura must comprehend that
even if a miracle took place and narco activities disappeared overnight, their nation would still be home to
a deadly nether world whose unscrupulous denizens
are adept at murder, torture, kidnapping, extortion,
money laundering, loan-sharking, prostitution, human smuggling, and a score of other crimes. In contacts with Mexican interlocutors, U.S. civilian and
military officials must avoid hubris and recognize the
severe limitation on ameliorating, much less solving,
formidable problems in other countries unless local
leaders challenge the miscreants in their midst.
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